Value of food provisioning ecosystem services in the Northeast Atlantic by Oljemark, Kaius
  
HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO 
Value of food provisioning 
ecosystem services in the 
Northeast Atlantic 
 
 
 
 
Kaius Oljemark 
Master’s thesis 
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 
Department of Economics and Management 
University of Helsinki 
November 2019 
  
Faculty 
Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry 
  
Degree Programme 
Department of Economics and Management 
Author 
Kaius Oljemark 
  
Title 
Value of food provisioning ecosystem services in the Northeast Atlantic 
  
Subject/Study track 
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 
 
Level 
Master’s thesis 
  
Month and year 
November 2019 
Number of pages 
68 
Abstract 
Lack of scientific knowledge of how marine ecosystems relate to each other, how they are producing services and how to 
quantify ecosystem flows at adequate accuracy, have led to a situation where marine ecosystems are undervalued or even 
completely ignored in decision-making process. More research is needed from the value of marine ecosystem services in order 
to better integrate them into decision-making. Seafood production is essential part of the marine provisioning services and the 
aim of this study is to estimate the potential value of the European Union’s seafood production in the Northeast Atlantic (FAO 
fishing area 27). 
Fish stocks are currently managed too short-sightedly in EU and for that reason, EU is unable to take full advantage of the true 
potential of the stocks. This study provides quantitative analysis of the potential benefits of the rebuilt fish stocks in the 
Northeast Atlantic for the EU. Growth potential of EU’s wild capture production in Northeast Atlantic were calculated by 
comparing current production and theoretical maximal production, where all fish stocks could provide Maximum Sustainable 
Yield (MSY) at the same time. Besides quantifying potential value of EU landings in Northeast Atlantic, this study also 
compares different rebuilding pathways to achieve collective MSY. 
According to the result of this study, EU fishing fleet would get €4.43 billion more annual profit if every stock in the Northeast 
Atlantic could produce MSY. In order fish stocks to produce MSY, the long-term effort level of EU fleet should be dropped by 
38%. Total revenue of fishing is maximised when stocks are harvested to a level of Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), where 
annual profit would be €4.64 billion more than currently while long-term effort level should be dropped by 48%. 
In this study, several management strategies for rebuilding the Northeast Atlantic stocks were compared, and rebuilding time 
and net present value were calculated for each management strategy. The results address that it is preferable to decrease effort 
level as soon as possible to match the effort level of MSY or MEY. The sooner the optimum effort level is reached, the shorter 
is the rebuilding time and the higher is the net present value. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tutkitun tiedon puute meriekosysteemien suhteesta toisiinsa, kuinka ne tuottavat ekosysteemipalveluja ja kuinka arvottaa niistä 
saatavia hyötyjä tarpeeksi tarkasti, on johtanut tilanteeseen, missä meriekosysteemien arvo päätöksentekoprosessissa on 
alimitoitettu tai jopa täysin sivuutettu. Arvottamistutkimusta meren ekosysteemipalveluista tulisi lisätä, jotta ne kyettäisiin 
ottamaan paremmin huomioon päätöksenteossa. Merenelävät ovat olennainen osa merestä saatavia ekosysteemipalveluja ja 
tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on arvioida Euroopan unionin merenelävätuotannon potentiaalinen arvo Koillis-Atlantilla (FAO 
kalastusalue 27). 
Nykyisin EU hallinnoi kalakantojaan liian lyhytnäköisesti, jonka takia se ei kykene hyödyntämään merenelävätuotannon koko 
potentiaalia. Tämä tutkimus tarjoaa kvantitatiivisen analyysin Koillis-Atlantin uudelleenrakennettujen kalakantojen 
mahdollisista hyödyistä Euroopan unionille. EU:n kalansaaliin kasvupotentiaali Koillis-Atlantilla laskettiin vertaamalla nykyistä 
tuotantoa teoreettiseen maksimituotantoon, joka saataisiin, kun kaikki kalakannat olisivat suurimman kestävän tuoton tasolla 
samanaikaisesti. Koillis-Atlantin kalansaaliin potentiaalisen arvon määrittämisen lisäksi, tämä tutkimus vertaa eri 
uudelleenrakentamisvaihtoehtoja kollektiivisen enimmäistuotannon saavuttamiseksi. 
Tulosten perusteella EU:n kalastusalusten vuotuinen voitto kasvaisi 4.43 miljardia euroa jos kaikki Koillis-Atlantin kalakannat 
kykenisivät saavuttamaan suurimman kestävän tuoton tason. EU:n kalastusalusten tulisi vähentää pitkänaikavälin 
kalastuspanosta 38 prosenttia, jotta suurimman kestävän tuoton taso olisi mahdollista saavuttaa. Kalastuksesta saatava voitto 
olisi suurimmillaan, jos kalakannat saalistettaisiin suurimman kestävän taloudellisen tuoton tasolle, jolloin vuotuiset voitot 
kasvaisivat 4.64 miljardia euroa nykyisestä ja pitkänaikavälin kalastuspanos laskisi 48 prosenttia nykyisestä. 
Tutkimuksessa vertailtiin useampia vaihtoehtoja Koillis-Atlantin kalakantojen uudelleenrakentamiseksi ja kaikille 
vaihtoehtoisille poluille laskettiin uudelleenrakentamisaika sekä nettonykyarvo. Tulosten perusteella on suositeltavaa laskea 
kalastuspanos mahdollisimman nopeasti vastaamaan suurinta kestävää tuottoa tai vaihtoehtoisesti suurinta kestävää taloudellista 
tuottoa. Mitä nopeammin optimaalinen kalastuspanos saavutetaan, sitä lyhyempi on uudelleenrakentamisaika ja suurempi on 
nettonykyarvo. 
Avainsanat 
 
Kalatalous, kalakantojen elvyttäminen, Gordon-Schaefer -malli, ekosysteemipalveluiden arvottaminen 
 
Ohjaajat 
Marko Lindroos ja Jordi Guillen 
 
Säilytyspaikka 
Viikin kampuskirjasto, Viikinkaari 11 A, 00014 Helsingin yliopisto 
  
Muita tietoja 
i 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Aim of the study and used methods ................................................ 3 
2 Ecosystem services ................................................................................. 6 
2.1 Classification of ecosystem services ............................................... 7 
2.1.1 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ......................................... 8 
2.1.2 Cascade models ...................................................................... 10 
2.2 Marine ecosystems goods and services ......................................... 14 
3 Food from the ocean – aquaculture & wild capture.............................. 18 
3.1 World’s aquaculture and wild capture ........................................... 18 
3.2 Wild capture fish in the EU ........................................................... 19 
3.3 Aquaculture in the EU ................................................................... 20 
3.4 Declining fish stocks ..................................................................... 22 
3.5 Fishery management ...................................................................... 25 
3.6 Rebuilding fishery ......................................................................... 27 
4 Methods and objectives ........................................................................ 30 
4.1 Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model ........................................... 31 
4.1.1 Biological optimum ................................................................ 31 
4.1.2 Economic optimal harvest ...................................................... 34 
4.1.3 The open-access fishery ......................................................... 35 
4.1.4 Summary of the Gordon-Schaefer model .............................. 36 
4.2 Analysis outside of the equilibrium ............................................... 38 
4.3 Profit function of the model .......................................................... 39 
4.4 Forming collective MSY of the Northeast Atlantic stocks ........... 40 
4.5 Management points and alternative pathways to rebuild stocks ... 41 
4.6 Data ............................................................................................... 42 
5 Results ................................................................................................... 44 
ii 
 
 
5.1 Management points ....................................................................... 44 
5.2 Rebuilding the stocks .................................................................... 45 
5.3 Optional pathways to rebuild the stocks ........................................ 47 
5.4 Incentive to leave the industry ....................................................... 49 
5.5 Potential value and yield of all seafood production ...................... 51 
6 Discussion ............................................................................................. 55 
7 Conclusion ............................................................................................ 60 
References .................................................................................................... 61 
Annexes 1 ..................................................................................................... 68 
 
  
iii 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Categorization of ecosystem services by Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment. (MEA, 2005; Costanza et al., 2017) .............. 8 
Table 2: Typology of ecosystem services in TEEB (de Groot et al., 
2010) ................................................................................................... 13 
Table 3: Typology of marine ecosystem services (Böhnke-Henrichs et 
al., 2013) ............................................................................................. 16 
Table 4: Summary of the equations of Gordon-Schaefer model. ....... 37 
Table 5: Summary of the STECF Annual Economic Report of EU 
Fishing Fleet (presented in millions). Data is from 2018 report and 
represents 2016 numbers. (STECF, 2018a) ........................................ 42 
Table 6: Landing value, cost, profit and relative effort level for four 
alternative management schemes. All monetary values are in billion 
euros. ................................................................................................... 45 
Table 7a&b: Comparison of the results. All monetary values are in 
billion euros. ....................................................................................... 57 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: The concept of ecosystem services in millennium ecosystem 
assessment (adapted from MEA, 2005) ................................................ 9 
Figure 2: The ecosystem service cascade model initially proposed in 
Haines-Young and Potschin (2010) modified to separate benefits and 
values in de Groot et al. (2010) .......................................................... 11 
Figure 3: Summary of the different management options. (adapted 
from Sumaila, 2001) ........................................................................... 36 
Figure 4: Value of landing, costs and operating profit as a function of 
effort for the EU fleet in the Northeast Atlantic. ................................ 44 
Figure 5: Example of the one rebuilding pathway. Fishing effort is 
steadily reduced in five years to match the MSY level of effort. ....... 46 
Figure 6: Net present value of different MSY pathways. Period under 
review 2019-2050. .............................................................................. 48 
Figure 7: Annual profits and rebuilding time of different MSY 
pathways. ............................................................................................ 48 
Figure 8: Net present value of the two incentive programs and current 
state. Period under review 2019-2050. ............................................... 50 
Figure 9: Annual profits of incentive programs. ................................ 51 
Figure 10: Potential production of total seafood in EU (wild capture 
and aquaculture).................................................................................. 53 
iv 
 
 
Figure 11: Potential value of total seafood production in EU (wild 
capture and aquaculture). .................................................................... 53 
 
1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Importance of the ocean cannot be stressed too much, since it covers more than 70% 
of earth’s surface and nearly 50% of planet’s entire species are dependent on it 
(Djavidnia et al., 2014). Ocean includes wide variety of ecosystems, ranging from 
deep seas to highly productive coastal waters. Oceans maintain life on our planet and 
offers vital ecosystem services to benefit of us all. Fisheries and aquaculture are an 
important food and protein source in all over the world, especially in least 
development countries (FAO, 2018). However, marine ecosystem services are not 
limited to seafood, albeit it is the most visible part. Marine ecosystems regulate 
climate by transporting heat from the equator to the poles, they are influencing 
world’s air circulation by producing over half of the world’s oxygen and storing 50 
times more carbon dioxide than atmosphere. In addition to those, marine ecosystems 
avert floods, storms and erosions; enables wide range of recreational activities, which 
bolster tourism; provide raw materials for the use of medical purposes; and support 
cultural and aesthetic uses - just to name a few. While providing these services, 
marine ecosystems create business opportunities, which are employing over 4 million 
people in EU, generating €658 billion of turnover and €180 billion of gross value 
added in 2017. (European Commission, 2019) 
 
Benefits of the marine ecosystem services are undeniable, and societies are highly 
dependent on them, but increased human pressure on marine resources has led to a 
serious concern about the state and health of the marine ecosystems (Halpern et al., 
2008). Until 1990s, marine management were operated sectoral but since then, the 
shift has happened towards a more holistic approach to considering ecosystem 
services. Management tools with wider perspective were needed, since sectoral 
approach was not able to reveal the links and relationships between ecological, social 
and economic systems (Atkins et al., 2011). Ecosystem-based management measures 
direct and indirect contributions that ecosystems have on human well-being and 
highlights how different ecosystem services interlinks with each other (de Groot et 
al., 2010). Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005) divides ecosystem 
services into four categories: provision services, regulating services, cultural 
services and supporting services. However, classification by MEA is not the best 
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suited for environmental valuation and accounting, and for that reason several 
improvements have been introduced to it. The most known attempts for replacing 
MEA are The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) and the Common 
International Classification of Ecosystem Services (CICES). 
 
Lately economists have addressed growing interest to ecosystem services and their 
valuation. Valuation of ecosystem services has been controversial topic ever since 
Costanza et al. (1997) published their study on the monetary value of the world’s 
ecosystem services. Some scientists argue that valuation can support decision-
making process and give attention to the ecosystems that otherwise would go 
unnoticed (Laurans and Mermet, 2014), while others state that ecosystem services 
should be valued economically only on very specific circumstances, otherwise 
valuation studies will only contribute to worse decisions (Spangenberg and Settele, 
2016). Ecologists tend to underestimate the need for economic valuation of 
ecosystem services because in their opinion, nature has an intrinsic value, which 
makes it irreplaceable, and thus there is no point of giving an economic value to the 
nature since it should already be above everything else (McCauley, 2006). 
Ecosystem services are often seen too complex and multi-dimensional to be 
adequately valued with classical economical tools, where aggregated individual 
preferences represent values of the whole group (Chee, 2004; Kenter et al., 2016). 
 
Even though economic valuation methods and their purpose remains controversial, 
still today’s decision-making relies heavily on economics, thus the environmental 
benefits should also be expressed in monetary terms, at least on some part, otherwise 
they are at risk to be overlooked. Herendeen (1998) captures the same idea in a 
compact form: “Economics is there first, and all must speak its language seriously, at 
least some of the time, or be cut out of crucial part of the debate”. Of course, 
decisions should not be based only for economic valuation and therefore marine 
ecosystem services assessment should cross scientific boundaries in order to achieve 
satisfying results. As an indication of that, over 400 marine ecosystem service 
practitioner listed comprehensive integration of economics, natural and social 
sciences into ecosystem service assessment, as one of today’s top research priorities 
(Rivero and Villasante, 2016). 
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However, economic valuation has a significant role in decision-making and in the 
best case, economic valuation provides means and methods to rationalize the process 
(Laurans and Mermet, 2014). For example, valuation of ecosystem services could 
shape ecological results to more understandable form for decision-makers and in that 
way, they could be taken better into account when new policies are determined 
(Armsworth and Roughgarden, 2001). Economic valuation reveals problems and 
trade-offs of different management options and enables their comparison, which 
creates foundation for coherent public policies. Economic valuation also reveals 
some of the hidden values, which otherwise would go unnoticed. For example, the 
resource could be largely undervalued, or it may cause externalities (positive or 
negative) and without proper economic valuation, those market failures would not 
have such an impact on the project planning (Armsworth and Roughgarden, 2001). 
Thus, valuation could help to protect ecosystem services by transforming the 
biological data into more usable form for decision-makers perspective (Laurans and 
Mermet, 2014). 
 
Humans cause harmful impacts to marine ecosystems and their services for example 
by overfishing, commercial shipping, nutrient runoff, pollution, climate change and 
habitat destruction (Halpern et al., 2008). Lack of scientific knowledge about how 
marine ecosystems relate to each other, how they are producing services and how to 
quantify ecosystem flows at adequate accuracy, have led to situation where marine 
ecosystems are undervalued or even completely ignored in decision-making process 
(Barbier, 2017; Rivero and Villasante, 2016). More research is needed from the value 
of marine ecosystem services in order to better integrate them into decision-making. 
Better decisions for marine ecosystems could be made if the quantitative relationship 
between ecosystem services and their benefits were better understood (Barbier, 
2017). 
 
1.1 Aim of the study and used methods 
Seafood production is essential part of the marine provisioning services and this 
study provides a small piece to a larger entity that strives to estimate the value of 
marine ecosystem services. The aim of this study is to estimate the potential value of 
the European Union’s seafood production in the Northeast Atlantic (FAO fishing 
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area 27). Marine ecosystem valuation studies aim to fill the knowledge gap by 
conducting quantitative analysis of the relationship between marine ecosystem 
services and their benefits.  
Fish stocks are currently managed too short-sightedly and because of that, EU is 
unable to take full advantage of the true potential of the stocks. This study provides 
quantitative analysis of potential benefits of rebuilt fish stocks. In order to rebuild the 
stocks, investments must be placed on long-term benefits of the stocks by reducing 
fishing effort. Because of effort reduction, net profit of the fishing might decrease 
temporarily but eventually it will lead to higher landings and earnings. 
EU fleets are currently operating inefficiently in terms of both catch and profit 
because of the overexploitation of the stocks. It is possible to increase profitability by 
reducing fishing effort in order stocks to grow. In the present study, growth potential 
of EU’s wild capture production in Northeast Atlantic were calculated by comparing 
current production and theoretical maximal production. Theoretical maximum 
production for the EU’s Northeast Atlantic fisheries were determined by assuming 
that all fish stocks could provide Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) at the same 
time and effort level of the fleet is reduced to a level where catching MSY is 
possible. 
When fishery is managed with MSY, it maximizes the populations of fish stocks but 
usually economists desire to manage stocks by maximizing economic benefits by 
maintaining the populations in level where maximum economic yield (MEY) is 
reached. However, this study primarily looks to manage fishery in a way that stocks 
can produce MSY, because that is also the objective for the EU Common Fishery 
Policy (CFP). In the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, EU made a 
commitment to restore and maintain harvested fish populations to a level, where 
MSY is produced. Objective was to reach optimal exploitation rates largely in 2015 
and for all stocks, no later than 2020 (European Commission, 2013a). 
Besides quantifying potential value of EU’s landings in Northeast Atlantic, this study 
also compares different rebuilding pathways to achieve collective MSY. Rebuilding 
time and net present value were calculated for each pathway. At the final part of the 
study, estimate is presented of the future’s total seafood production in the Northeast 
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Atlantic, which includes both wild capture and aquaculture production. Four 
arbitrary annual growth rates were used for estimating the aquaculture production 
growth in Europe. 
This study follows the paper published by Guillen et al. (2016) in order to see at 
which direction, have the Northeast Atlantic fish stocks developed since their study, 
and have the EU’s position changed in relation to MSY. To ensure comparable 
results, method of this study adapts the method of Guillen et al. (2016). Study uses 
the Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model for fisheries management. 
The structure of the study is formed as follows. Section 2 discussed subject of 
ecosystem services, and different models and typologies for ecosystem services are 
presented. Section 3 provides a review of seafood production and current issues in 
fisheries. Section 4 addresses method and objective of the study. Results are reported 
in section 5, discussion and conclusion are in section 6 and 7. 
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2 Ecosystem services 
Nation’s wealth generates from four source of capital: manufactured capital (material 
goods and infrastructure), human capital (knowledge, attitude and skills of the 
individuals), social capital (trust, norms and institutions) and natural capital 
(ecosystem services) (World Bank, 2006). Natural capital is providing all the 
necessary conditions to support life in this planet, so in that sense, it can be seen as 
the most important form of capital. The terms natural capital and ecosystem services 
are often mixed together. Ecosystem services are the benefits (e.g. material, energy, 
intangible) people are receiving from the natural ecosystems and natural capital are 
the stocks of natural ecosystems (Costanza et al., 1997). For example, fish stock is 
component of natural capital, while food provisioning is one of the ecosystem 
services it provides. 
Ecosystem services are often referred as links to connect biophysical reality to 
human socio-economic well-being (TEEB, 2010). Ecosystem services are nature's 
fundamental structures and without them life in the Earth could not exist, at least as 
the way we know it. Human’s basic needs are mostly provided by the ecosystem 
services and it is impossible to imagine life without them. Ecosystem services are 
indispensable, otherwise well-being and health of the people would be in jeopardy. 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) 
Often ecosystem services are seen only as material goods such as food, fibre or 
wood. Material centred approach easily overlooks the non-market benefits, even 
though they are playing a vital role in providing well-being to humans. These non-
market ecosystem services are contributing to ensure clean water flow, protect us 
from flooding and from other natural disasters, like landslides or tsunamis. 
Ecosystem services provide climate regulation by maintaining world’s hydrological 
cycle and carbon sequestration by absorbing CO₂ from the atmosphere. Thanks to 
ecosystem services, people have opportunity to enjoy recreational activities and 
sometimes even form spirituals or religious bonds to landscape which ecosystem 
services provide. (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2010) 
There are a few often quoted and widely accepted definitions of ecosystem services. 
Westman (1977) was among the firsts to research ecosystem benefits and he 
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suggested that society could make better policy and management decisions by 
enumerating benefits that ecosystems could potentially provide. Daily (1997) 
proposed that ecosystem services are “the conditions and processes through which 
natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfil human 
life”. Costanza et al. (1997) suggested that “ecosystem functions refer variously to 
the habitat, biological or system properties or processes of ecosystems, and the 
ecosystem goods and services represent the benefits human population derive, 
directly or indirectly, from those ecosystem functions”. The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2005) adapted a broader vision by defining ecosystem services as 
benefits people obtain from the ecosystems. Jax et al. (2013) sums the definitions up 
by stating that ecosystem processes become ecosystem services only if they 
contribute somehow to human well-being, either actively or passively. 
The concept of ecosystem services is an important tool for linking ecosystems 
functions to human welfare, and it is highly relevant for decision-makers to be 
familiar with the links in order to make rational and far-reaching decisions 
concerning, for example, the use of natural resources (Fisher et al., 2009). 
 
2.1 Classification of ecosystem services 
Ecosystem service classifications were originally needed to make the concept of 
ecosystem services more accurate in order to enable discussions, assessments, 
modelling and valuation (Costanza et al., 2017). Classifications were needed to better 
assess the benefits that specific ecosystem service could potentially provide to human 
well-being. There are a number of different classifications of ecosystem services in 
the literature that have been developed over the last fifteen years (e.g. MA, 2005; 
Beaumont et al., 2007; TEEB, 2010; Haines-Young and Potschin, 2012; La Notte et 
al., 2017; Lillebø et al., 2017) and each has its own benefits and disadvantages 
(Hattam et al., 2015). 
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2.1.1 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005) were the first global and 
comprehensive assessment of the effects of ecosystem services to people’s welfare. 
MEA highlights that human’s well-being is maintained by ecosystem services and it 
shows that ecosystem services are the links between nature`s processes and human 
welfare (La Notte et al., 2017). 
MEA defined ecosystem services as the benefits people obtain from the ecosystems. 
According to the MEA, the ecosystem services can be divided into four broad 
categories: provisioning services, cultural services, regulating services and 
supporting services (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Categorization of ecosystem services by Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. (MEA, 2005; 
Costanza et al., 2017) 
1) Provisioning services are the products directly obtained from the ecosystem. 
Provisioning service include for example food, timber, fiber and medicine, and 
their value are usually defined in the market. 
 
2) Cultural services are non-material benefits people obtain from the 
ecosystems. Cultural services include aesthetic value, recreational activity, 
cultural identity, environmental related religious and spiritual experiences and 
tourism. For example, benefits that individual is getting from a hunting trip 
cannot be valued only by the catch, otherwise recreational benefits from a 
hiking in the forest are overlooked. It is hard to define monetary value for most 
of the cultural services because they are not market based. 
 
3) Regulating services are the benefits ecosystem services offer by regulating 
ecosystem processes. Maintaining the quality of air and soil, providing flood 
and disease control and water purification are few examples of regulating 
services. Often people take regulating services for granted, without even 
noticing nature’s part behind them. True value of the regulating services is 
recognized, at latest, when performance level of the services is deteriorated. 
 
4) Supporting services are needed to produce all other ecosystem services. These 
types of necessary services are photosynthesis, primary production and nutrient 
cycling, among many others. Supporting services are affecting to humans 
indirect by maintaining the processes and functions necessary for provisioning, 
regulating and cultural service. 
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Figure 1 illustrates how the four different service categories provide benefits to 
human well-being. Ecosystem services’ different importance level to human well-
being are presented by different shade and thickness of the arrows. Supporting 
service panel is placed in a way that none of the arrows is touching it, so there is no 
direct link between supporting services and human well-being. However, supporting 
services are providing benefits to humans through the provisioning, cultural and 
regulating ecosystem services. (Bouma and van Beukering, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 1: The concept of ecosystem services in millennium ecosystem assessment (adapted from MEA, 
2005) 
 
MEA have received much praise and its substantial impact to the ecosystem service 
research cannot be denied. Although, some shortcomings towards MEA have also 
been identified in the literature. Biggest shortcoming is related to supporting 
services, and more specifically distinction between ecosystem functions and 
ecosystem services. Supporting services are not directly offering any benefits to 
humans but they are a part of the natural mechanisms and processes that generates 
ecosystem services for humans. Problem with MEA classification is that it does not 
draw definite line between the ecosystem functions and ecosystem services. Lack of 
clear difference between ecosystem function and ecosystem service creates a risk of 
double counting, since giving a separate value to ecosystem function, would mean 
that value of that ecosystem function would be counted twice because it is already 
included in the valuation of ecosystem service (Ledoux and Turner, 2002; Boyd & 
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Banzhaf, 2007; Fisher et al., 2009). Ecosystem services should be the benefits that 
people are enjoying, while ecosystem functions should be the ecological processes 
that enable ecosystem services, and valuation should be given only for the ecosystem 
services. MEA is not suitable for economic valuation studies because it lacks 
hierarchy within the classification (Hattam et al., 2015). For example, water 
purification service is an ecosystem function, which is essential part of the provision 
service of the groundwater. Double counting occurs if the purification service is first 
evaluated independently and then second time as a part of the provisioning service of 
drinking water. MEA does not make clear difference between these two groups and 
therefore risk of double counting exists. (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2010) 
 
2.1.2 Cascade models 
Cascade models were introduced to fix the shortcoming of MEA. De Groot et al. 
(2010) introduced framework called The Economics of Ecosystems & Biodiversity 
(TEEB) and Haines-Young and Potschin (2010) introduced their approach, which 
later was used as a template to a European Environment Agency`s framework called 
Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services (CICES) (Haines-
Young and Potschin, 2012). Both approaches adapt much from the MEA but with a 
few critical changes they were able to form a more advanced classification model, 
which were better suited to reality. 
Haines-Young and Potschin (2010) modified MEA by excluding support services 
from the ecosystem services, and then dividing support services into two separate 
components; biophysical processes and ecosystem functions (see figure 2). This 
design makes clear distinction between nature’s ecological functions and ecosystem 
services. For example, woodland is a biophysical structure, which provide ecosystem 
functions like biomass production and water retention. Ecosystem functions provides 
ecosystem services, of which humans are benefiting. In this example case, ecosystem 
services, which are provided by the ecosystem functions, are for example flood 
protection and harvestable biomasses. (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2010) 
De Groot et al. (2010) further developed above described framework from Haines-
Young and Potschin (2010) by adding a component to illustrate the importance of 
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valuing generated benefits. Value component highlights the fact that not all 
generated benefits are market based and valuing some of the benefits may require 
more advanced valuation methods. De Groot et al. (2010) argue that ecosystem 
services have a huge impact on the multiple aspects of human welfare, so it is only 
smart to measure the magnitude of the different welfare aspects by valuing the 
impacts. Comprehensive valuation of potential benefits provides a tool to evaluate 
trade-offs that occurs with different management strategies. 
 
 
Figure 2: The ecosystem service cascade model initially proposed in Haines-Young and Potschin 
(2010) modified to separate benefits and values in de Groot et al. (2010) 
 
Cascade model is a simple approach where cascade between two ends of a 
“production chain” is clearly displayed, which is a key advantage compared to MEA 
(Haines-Young and Potschin, 2010). Cascade model shows the path from ecological 
structures to an ecosystem benefit, and it illustrate how wide spectrum of different 
steps are needed before nature can provide ecosystem services. With cascade model 
the trade-offs between different functions are more easily recognized since the links 
are presented in more detail. De Groot et al. (2010) note that more detailed and more 
informative presentation would help decision makers to realize a complexity of 
ecosystem services. Double counting issue was related strongly to MEA, however, 
with cascade model the problem is considerably smaller and easier to avoid due to 
separation of ecosystem function and the ecosystem service. Böhnke-Henrichs et al. 
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(2013) state that those ecosystem service classification models, which include the 
supporting service category into typology are not recommended for using in 
economic valuation studies. (de Groot et al., 2010) 
De Groot et al. (2010) in TEEB, developed typology of ecosystem services from the 
MEA approach. Typology of ecosystem service used in TEEB is listed in table 2. 
Typology used in TEEB is provided here as an example because it is widely adapted 
classification and many studies today are referring to it (e.g. Böhnke-Henrichs et al., 
2013 & Hattam et al., 2015). Most fundamental changes in TEEB compared to MEA, 
were conducted in categorization, when supporting service was relocated to its own 
component and habitat service was included into the classification as a separate 
service type. TEEB identified habitat service as a separate service type in order to 
highlight the importance of ecosystem to provide nursery service for migratory 
species and maintain good habitat to protect gene pool. State of the habitat is 
defining factor in provision of these services. For example, many commercial fish 
species use mangrove ecosystems as nursery service for their pawn. This service has 
clearly economic value, but it is easily overlooked since fishes are caught elsewhere 
(Barbier, 2017). Habitat service ensure that nursery service is being valued properly.  
 
Haines-Young and Potschin (2018) in Common International Classification of 
Ecosystem Services (CICES), formed ecosystem services typology, which differs 
slightly from de Groot et al. (2010). In general, the two typologies are almost 
identical but there is one service type less in CICES than TEEB. In TEEB, regulation 
and habitat services are two separate service types but in CICES those categories are 
compounded into one service type called regulation and maintenance service. Two 
other service types in CICES are the same as in TEEB: provisioning service and 
cultural service. 
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Table 2: Typology of ecosystem services in TEEB (de Groot et al., 2010) 
  Service types 
  PROVISIONING SERVICES 
1 Food 
2 Water 
3 Raw Materials 
4 Genetic Resources 
5 Medicinal resources 
6 Ornamental resources 
  REGULATING SERVICES 
7 Air quality regulation 
8 Climate regulation 
9 Moderation of extreme events 
10 Regulation of water flows 
11 Waste treatment 
12 Erosion prevention 
13 Maintenance of soil fertility 
14 Pollination 
15 Biological control 
  HABITAT SERVICE 
16 Maintenance of life cycles of migratory species 
17 Maintenance of genetic diversity 
  CULTURAL AND AMENITY SERVICE 
18 Aesthetic information 
19 Opportunities for recreation and tourism 
20 Inspiration for culture, art and design 
21 Spiritual experience 
22 Information for cognitive development 
 
 
It is controversial, whether abiotic components should be included into ecosystem 
service classifications. On the one hand, argument can be made that abiotic 
components are ecosystem services because they are integral to ecosystems and they 
are determining ecological functions. For instance, Atkins et al. (2011) and Lillebø et 
al. (2017) included abiotic raw materials and human activities like non-renewable 
energy generation and shipping into the classification. On the other hand, arguments 
can be made that abiotic components should not be included in the classification 
because ecosystem services are meant to be delivered by the living components of 
the ecosystem. The Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services 
(CICES) solved this problem by developing a separate classification for abiotic 
outputs from ecosystems. (Hattam et al., 2015) 
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Costanza et al. (2017) are not too fond of the cascade models and they state that it is 
far too simple approach to a complex reality. They declare that model should better 
highlight how complex, non-linear and dynamic is the relationship between 
ecosystem functions and ecosystem benefits. At the same time, Costanza et al. (2017) 
argue against a distinction of services and benefits. They are asking is there really a 
difference between benefits and services, when ecosystem services are, by the 
definition, functions and processes of ecosystems that benefit humans, directly or 
indirectly, whether humans perceive those benefits or not. Potschin and Haines-
Young (2016) admit that cascade model describes the relationship between 
ecological structures and generated value as a rather linear way, and therefore the 
model is limited. However, regardless of simplicity, they argue that the model is 
standing on its ground because elements in cascade model provide tools for 
representing and understanding complexity of ecosystem services. 
Potschin-Young et al. (2018) conducted a research of role of the cascade models in 
work of ecosystem services. They found out that multiple studies have used cascade 
models in past ten years. In those studies, cascade models have been used inter alia 
as an organising structure to help simplify a complex reality, to re-frame 
biodiversity-related issues and for providing analytical template for empirical 
research. Research revealed also some issues related to cascade models, since in few 
studies participants were not familiar with the classification structure of the model. 
For example, participants were confused by the concepts of ecological functions and 
ecosystem services, and many times distinction between services and benefits caused 
uncertainty for the participants and their stakeholders. Potschin-Young et al. (2018) 
assumed that problems were caused by poor guidance rather than some fundamental 
problem of the model. 
 
2.2 Marine ecosystems goods and services 
Marine ecosystem services include a wide range of habitats and ecosystems, since 
marine and coastal environments can be considered to begin from 100 kilometers 
inland (Barbier, 2017). Several ecosystem service classifications exist, as stated 
earlier, but most of them have been developed with a terrestrial focus, therefore they 
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cannot be directly adapted to marine ecosystem services (Liquete et al., 2013). Still, 
there are some ecosystem service studies and classifications in the literature, which 
are targeted specifically for the coastal and marine habitat (e.g. Beaumont et al., 
2008; Atkins et al., 2011; Böhnke-Henrichs et al., 2013; Liquete et al., 2013; Hattam 
et al., 2015; Lillebø et al., 2017). 
Böhnke-Henrichs et al. (2013) notice that ecosystem service concept was rarely used 
for maritime planning because only few classification models had been made for the 
marine ecosystem services. Beaumont et al., (2008) and Atkins et al. (2011) were 
among firsts attempts to define classification model specific for marine ecosystem 
services. Unfortunately, those models were not suitable to analyze economic trade-
offs properly because they took example from MEA (2005) by including category of 
supporting service within the typology. In addition, Böhnke-Henrichs et al. (2013) 
stated that Beaumont et al. (2008) fail to keep distinctions between services, benefits 
and values because they include ‘option value’ as a service type. 
Böhnke-Henrichs et al. (2013) and Hattam et al. (2015) released separate 
classification models of marine ecosystem services, which were based on the TEEB 
typology. Böhnke-Henrichs et al. (2013) and Hattam et al. (2015) adapted the TEEB 
typology because the framework distinguishes between ecosystem processes, 
services, benefits and values. Frameworks from Böhnke-Henrichs et al. (2013) and 
Hattam et al. (2015) are different with each other only on minor details. For example, 
Hattam et al. (2015) did not include seawater as an ecosystem service and they 
separated wild captured and farmed seafood from each other. Otherwise, the two 
frameworks are identical. Framework from Böhnke-Henrichs et al. (2013) is 
presented in table 3. 
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Table 3: Typology of marine ecosystem services (Böhnke-Henrichs et al., 2013) 
Theme 
Ecosystem 
service 
Description Example 
 
Provisioning 
Services 
 
 
1. Sea Food 
 
 
2. Sea Water 
 
 
 
3. Raw Materials 
 
 
4. Genetic 
Resources 
 
 
 
5. Medicinal 
Resources 
 
 
6. Ornamental 
Resources 
 
Marine fauna and flora provide 
food for humans 
 
Marine water in oceans, seas and 
inland seas, which are extracted for 
economic benefits of humans 
 
Coastal and marine environments 
provide materials for consumption 
 
Marine flora and fauna provide 
genetic materials for use in non-
marine and non-medicinal contexts 
 
 
Coastal and marine environments 
provide materials for medicinal 
benefits 
 
Coastal and marine environments 
provide materials for decoration, 
fashion, jewellery, souvenirs, etc. 
 
 
Seafood, seaweed
  
 
Seawater used in shipping, 
industrial cooling 
 
 
Non-food algae, sand, salt 
 
 
The use of marine flora and 
fauna-derived genetic material 
to improve crop resistance to 
saline conditions 
 
Marine-derived 
pharmaceuticals 
 
 
Shells, aquarium fishes, pearls, 
coral 
 
Regulating 
Services 
 
7. Air Purification 
 
 
8. Climate 
Regulation 
 
 
 
9. Disturbance 
Prevention 
 
 
 
 
10. Regulation of 
Water Flows 
 
 
11. Waste 
Treatment 
 
 
 
12. Coastal 
Erosion 
Prevention 
 
 
13. Biological 
Control 
 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems 
provide air purification service 
 
Biotic elements of a coastal and 
marine ecosystems provide 
maintenance of a favourable 
climate conditions 
 
Marine ecosystem structures 
mitigate the intensity of 
environmental hazards such as 
storm floods, tsunamis, and 
hurricanes 
 
Marine and coastal ecosystems 
maintain current structures of 
localized coastal currents 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems are 
able to remove pollutants by 
processes such as storage, burial, 
and biochemical recycling 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems 
provide Coastal Erosion Prevention 
 
 
 
Marine and coastal ecosystems 
maintain food web structure and 
natural healthy population 
dynamics 
 
 
The removal from the air of 
pollutants like fine dust 
 
The production, consumption 
and use by marine organisms of 
gases 
 
 
Marine ecosystem structures 
like salt marshes, sea grass 
beds, and mangroves, directly 
reduce environmental 
disturbance 
 
Macro algae influence localized 
current intensity 
 
 
Shellfish filter and purify coastal 
waters 
 
 
 
The maintenance of coastal 
dunes by coastal vegetation 
 
 
 
Herbivorous fishes minimize 
algae population for the 
benefits of reef ecosystems 
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Habitat 
Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Lifecycle 
Maintenance 
 
 
 
 
15. Gene Pool 
Protection 
 
 
 
Particular marine and coastal 
habitats provide essential 
environments for migratory 
species’ populations to reproduce 
and maturate juveniles. 
 
Marine habitats maintain viable 
gene pool through natural selection 
and evolutionary processes 
 
Provide reproduction habitat to 
species that are harvested 
elsewhere 
 
 
 
Marine ecosystems are 
supporting genetic diversity, 
which helps species to better 
adapt for changing environment 
    
Cultural & 
Amenity 
Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. Recreation 
and Leisure 
 
 
 
17. Aesthetic 
Information 
 
 
 
18. Inspiration 
for Culture, Art 
and Design 
 
19. Spiritual 
Experience 
 
 
20. Information 
for Cognitive 
Development 
 
Particular state of marine and 
coastal ecosystems is needed for 
some recreation and leisure 
opportunities 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems 
contribute to the landscape which 
generates emotional reaction 
within the individual observer 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems 
provide environmental features 
that inspire culture, art and design. 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems 
may help to create religious 
experiences 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems 
contribute to e.g. education and 
research 
 
Birdwatching, sailing, 
recreational fishing, scuba 
diving, etc. 
 
 
The visual facets that 
emotionally resonate with 
individual observers.  
 
 
The seascape has inspired 
directors, painters and 
musicians in their work 
 
Many ancient mythologies and 
religion have used the sea as 
part of their narratives 
 
Marine ecosystems condition 
impacts environmental 
education for all age groups 
 21. Cultural 
Heritage and 
Identity 
 
Coastal and marine ecosystems 
have influence on Cultural Heritage 
and Identity. This includes the 
importance of marine and coastal 
environments in cultural traditions 
and folklore. 
Seas are listed as UNESCO 
World Heritage sites for 
example the Wadden Sea. 
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3 Food from the ocean – aquaculture & wild capture 
Marine ecosystem services provide fishing and aquaculture opportunities, which 
provides food, employment and income for millions of people all over the world. 
Nutritionally fish and fish products are huge part of the people’s diet, especially in 
least development countries, where fish plays a major role in food security (Ye et al., 
2013). In 2015, least developed countries’ fish protein intake was approximately 
26% of their all-animal protein intake, while people in developed countries received 
11% of their diets’ animal protein from fishes. Outliers in this data are the world’s 
poorest countries, like Bangladesh, Cambodia and Ghana, where people receive more 
than 50% of their animal protein intake from the fish. Majority of world’s population 
growth is happening in least development countries, where the fish consumption is 
already high. Hence, healthy fish stocks and aquaculture are in key role, when 
world’s constantly growing population are tried to feed. (FAO, 2018)  
 
3.1 World’s aquaculture and wild capture 
World’s total marine food production was 171 million tonnes in 2016 and about 88% 
of that was directly utilized in human consumption. From the total seafood 
production, about 53% comes from wild capture and 47% from aquaculture. 
Intensive growth in last two decades of the aquaculture have been remarkable, since 
in 1990, aquaculture’s share of the world total seafood supply was only around 10%. 
When considering the great increase, it seems clear that in near future aquaculture’s 
contribution to fish and other seafood supply will exceed that of wild capture 
fisheries. (FAO, 2018) 
Aquaculture has grown fast in past 20 years and in this point in time, it has important 
role in global food supply and economic growth (Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Committee for Fisheries, STECF, 2018b). FAO (2018) calculated that global value 
of aquaculture production was €220 billion in 2016, which is four time greater than 
the same value in 1990. Total aquaculture production was 80 million tonnes in 2016 
and it was divided to inland and marine production, 64% and 36%, respectively. 
Aquaculture markets have formed naturally to Asia, since over 89% of the world’s 
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aquaculture products are produced there. China is the global market leader in 
aquaculture sector with 62% market share. (FAO, 2018) 
Despite the growing attention that aquaculture production has received, still wild 
capture fisheries remains significant for overall supply of the seafood. World’s total 
marine catch have declined slightly from 81.2 million tonnes in 2015 to 79.3 million 
tonnes in 2016. Marine catches have stayed around the same level since 1995, and 
major reasons for that is the overfishing, pollution and habitat loss (Ye et al., 2013). 
Even though the wild capture fish yields have been stagnated for almost 20 years, 
stocks could grow and provide higher yield in the future if managed properly. (FAO, 
2018) 
In economic terms, the marine food production is highly relevant, since they are 
some of the world most traded food items. In 2016, 60 million tonnes of fish and fish 
products were exported with a value of USD 143 billion, trade have increased by 7% 
over the year before. Fishery provides livelihood to millions of people, since in 2016, 
59.6 million people received their income from primary production of either fish 
capture or aquaculture, 32% were working in aquaculture and 68% in fisheries. 
(FAO, 2018) 
 
3.2 Wild capture fish in the EU 
In 2016, the EU fleet landing reached 4.9 million tonnes, which represent about 5-
6% of the global landing. The value of total landing in EU was €7.7 billion and it 
was 9% more than year before. Overexploitation has been affecting negatively on a 
EU’s wild capture, since it lowers the harvesting opportunities and increases costs. 
Five member states (Spain, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Denmark) accounted 
over 70% of EU’s total landed value, Spain was the largest (25%) followed by 
France (15%). Same five countries accounted also a major part (60%) of the EU’s 
total landings by weight. In 2016, Atlantic herring, Atlantic mackerel and European 
sprat were the most landed species in terms of weight. Top species in terms of value 
were European hake, yellowfin tuna and Atlantic mackerel. (STECF, 2018a) 
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Fleet capacity of the EU fell by 1% from year before and accounted 83 360 vessels in 
2016. Total number of vessels are divided into two groups: active and inactive. 
Active vessels accounted for 65 398 in 2016 and it has increased by 2% in a year, 
while number of inactive vessels declined by 12%. Total capacity of EU fleets has 
been declining for numerous of years and the same trend can also be seen in other 
developed countries (Ye and Gutierrez, 2017). Total amount of vessels in EU have 
declined 14% from 2008. Since 2008, fleet capacity in EU has declined also in terms 
of engine power and weight; these sectors have decreased 14% and 18%, 
respectively. (STECF, 2018a) 
Most of the EU landings are generated from the Northeast Atlantic, Baltic and North 
seas (FAO fishing area 27) and Mediterranean and Black seas (FAO fishing area 37). 
EU’s fishing fleets operates also much further away from the EU continent and these 
areas are called “other fishing regions”. The North Sea & Eastern Arctic area 
accounts largest share (32%) of landing in terms of weight, followed by Northeast 
Atlantic (30%), other regions (15%) and Baltic Sea (13%). In terms of value, the 
Northeast Atlantic is the largest area by 33 percent, followed by North Sea and 
Eastern Arctic (27%), Mediterranean Sea (18%) and other regions (16%). (STECF, 
2018a) 
 
3.3 Aquaculture in the EU 
In world scale, the aquaculture is approaching already total production of wild 
capture fish, but the case is not the same in EU, where aquaculture production covers 
only about one fifth of the whole seafood production. European Union’s aquaculture 
production was 1.42 million tonnes in 2016, which was only 1.6% of world 
aquaculture production. Value of the production reached €4.89 billion in 2016, 
covering 2.2% of world’s total aquaculture value. EU’s aquaculture production is 
divided into three subsectors: marine fish, freshwater fish and shellfish. In terms of 
volume, European Union’s most produced subsector is shellfish (e.g. mussels and 
oysters), but in terms of the value, the biggest subsector is marine cultured fish. In 
2016, shellfish production covered 47% of the Europe’s total production weight, 
marine fish 31% and fresh water fish 22%. Marine fish provides 55% of European 
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aquaculture value, shellfish 23% and freshwater fish 21%. Prominent growth rates 
that has been observed in aquaculture production in all over the world, unfortunately, 
have not boosted European production, since total aquaculture production in Europe 
has stayed virtually unchanged for over 15 years. Even though the total production 
has not increased, the value of the production has grown significantly. (STECF, 
2018b) 
Even though, the growth rate of the aquaculture has not been significant, still EU 
acknowledge the importance of the aquaculture sector for achieving future’s food 
safety. EU has tried to generate growth by investing €1.17 billion to aquaculture 
sector over the period 2000-2014 and €1.72 billion over the period 2014-2020 
(Guillen et al., 2019). In European Commission’s strategic guidelines for the 
sustainable development of EU aquaculture (European Commission, 2013b), four 
priority areas were identified, that should be taken into account in order to improve 
overall performance of the aquaculture industry. For boosting aquaculture, European 
Commission advices that: administrative burden should be reduced, access to space 
and water should be eased, actions should be taken to improve aquacultures 
competitiveness, and competitive advantages should be searched from the health and 
the environmental aspects. European Commission’s Blue Growth Strategy also lists 
aquaculture as a sector that have high potential to provide sustainable jobs and 
growth in a future (European Commission, 2017). Desire to grow aquaculture sector 
does not come unilaterally from European Commission because member states 
expressed their willingness to participate in the challenge by stating in the 
Multiannual National Strategic Plan for the development of aquaculture activities 
that by 2020 EU marine finfish aquaculture production should be increased 60% and 
the shellfish production by 25% (European Commission, 2016). 
EU’s aquaculture is highly concentrated since five countries (Spain, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy and Greece) are covering 74% of the total production volume. The 
biggest producer in volume is Spain with 21% market share but United Kingdom has 
largest production value. This is explained with low market price of mussels, which 
represented 74% of the Spanish aquaculture production volume. European Union 
cultured fishes are mostly centralized between three species: Atlantic salmon, 
gilthead seabream and European seabass. Those three species cover 86% of EU’s 
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total sales volume and total sales value. EU’s main farmed shellfish species in 2016 
were Mediterranean mussels, blue mussels, pacific cupped oyster and Japanese 
carpet shell. More than one third of the total value generates from Pacific cupped 
oyster (38%), smaller part of the value comes from blue mussels (22%), unidentified 
mussels (13%), Japanese carpet shell (11%) and Mediterranean mussels (8%). 
(STECF, 2018b) 
 
3.4 Declining fish stocks 
Global fish stocks have depleted significantly due to overexploitation, illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, pollution and habitat loss during the last 
decade, and addition to those, climate change and costal environmental damages are 
causing major uncertainties to fish stocks development (Ye et al., 2013). MSY is the 
largest average catch that can be harvested over time from a fish stock under specific 
environmental conditions without damaging its long-term renewability (Smith, 
1980). Fish stocks are seen to be overexploited when abundance is lower than the 
level of MSY and underexploited when abundance is above MSY. According to 
FAO (2018), the percentage of fish stocks fished at biologically unsustainable1 level 
was 33% in 2015 and it has increased 23% on the last 40 years. Situation is 
extremely alarming with commercially fished stocks, where around 80 percent of the 
stocks are either overexploited, significantly depleted or fully exploited (Barkin and 
DeSombre, 2013). World’s fish harvest was at its highest point around 1998 and after 
that the harvests have been fallen year by year. After 1998, overfished stocks have 
increased nearly 10% and fishing industry has shifted to exploit formerly less 
harvested stocks (FAO, 2018). 
According to FAO report ´the State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018´, 
Mediterranean and Black Sea, Pacific-Southeast and Atlantic-Southwest are the most 
overexploited marine areas of the world, with overfishing rates about 40%. Report 
reveals that the situation is particularly challenging in the Mediterranean and Black 
                                                 
1 Stock less abundant than the level needed to produce MSY (FAO, 2018) 
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Sea, where the total landings have decreased considerably; the total landings was 2 
million tonnes in the mid-1980s but due to overfishing, the landings were only 1.1 
million tonnes in 2014. 
Even though the problem of overfishing has been acknowledged by different 
stakeholders for several decades, it still remains unresolved, and unsustainable 
fishing continues. In all its simplicity, fish stocks are dwindling because too many 
vessels are trying to make their living by chasing unsustainably managed stocks. In 
other words, biggest reason for declining fish stocks is a combination of overfishing 
and overcapacity and these are mainly consequences of the open-access character of 
the marine fishery resource. Luckily, fish stocks are reversible, and stocks should 
return to sustainable state after adequate recovery period but only if global fishing 
effort is reduced. Solution is that simple in theory, but in reality, it requires fishers to 
accept temporarily reduced income to revive stocks and, in many cases, it is too 
much to ask because many fishers are dependent on food and income that marine 
resources provide. (Clark, 2007) 
Marine renewable resources are open for everyone, since marine property rights 
cannot be clearly defined. Everyone can fish with appropriate equipment and that 
creates fierce competition of this common resource. Individual fisher is maximizing 
its profits by maximizing catch and in competitive situation, individual fisher has 
incentive to fish as much as possible, as fast as possible. Gordon (1954) showed that 
in unregulated open-access fishery, competition for scarce resource continues until 
the point is reached, where total revenue equals total costs, thus the profit equals 
zero. Equilibrium is reached in the zero-profit point because gained economic 
surplus from open-access fishery attracts excessive level of effort into the fishery and 
competition between fishing fleets continues until rising harvesting costs are meeting 
declining revenues, due to an overexploitation of the stock. In open-access long-run 
equilibrium, fish stock is biologically overfished because the catches exceed MSY. 
Clark (1976) developed Gordon’s theory by stating that fishers will harvest the stock 
to a point, where growth rate of the stock equals discount rate of the market. After 
this point, it is optimal to abandon the resource and invest the money to somewhere 
else, since the markets provide higher interest rate. Results from Gordon (1954) and 
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Clark (1976) clearly state that without any regulations, fish stocks are in danger to be 
overexploited due to open-access. 
Positive rents from the well-managed stocks attracts new fleets into the market and 
this trend have led to overcapacity of the global fishing effort, which is major 
impediment to achieve sustainably managed fish stocks (Beddington et al., 2007). 
Wakening to the fact that overcapacity is extremely harmful for the stock 
development, has led to attempts to reduce global fishing effort. Developed countries 
have reduced their effort from 1990s by a half and downward trend is still going on, 
but in global scale, the effort is still growing because developing countries have 
nearly tripled their effort compared to 1990s level. Rapid decrease in developed 
countries was achieved by tightened regulations, management interventions and 
relocations of fishing fleets. (Ye and Gutierrez, 2017) 
IUU fishing is a global phenomenon and it threatens the sustainability of fish stocks. 
Illegal fishing refers to actions, where fishers operate in the exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ) or in international waters despite laws and regulations. Unreported 
fishing occurs when fisher does not report harvested amount correctly and harvest 
exceeds individual quotas. Fishing is unregulated when it is taken place in areas or of 
fish stocks, where there are no conservation or management measures. IUU fishing 
hampers the rebuilding process of the fishery and reduces harvesting opportunities 
for legal fishers. Fishery regulations and fish stock management are in danger to 
become ineffective because of the IUU fishing. (Hutniczak et al., 2019) 
Awareness is raising from IUU fishing and work has already been done to eradicate 
it. For example, the United Nations states in Sustainable Development Goals (target 
14.4) that “By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing…in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest 
time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as 
determined by their biological characteristics”. 
Attempts have been made to quantify the IUU fishing problem. Agnew et al. (2009) 
studied IUU fishing in 54 countries and they estimate its annual value to be between 
$10 and $23.5 billion. Their data indicates the situation to be worst in developing 
countries, for example in West Africa the catches were 40% higher than originally 
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was reported. Pramod et al. (2019) tried to assess how big part of the Japan’s 
imported seafood is coming from the illegal and unreported sources. They found out 
that 24-36% from the total import amount (2.15 million tonnes) was from IUU 
sources, with the estimated value of $1.6 to $2.4 billion. Pramod et al. (2014) 
reported similar results when they stated that 20-32% of the wild-caught seafood 
imported to USA was from IUU sources in 2011, with the estimated value between 
$1.3 and $2.1 billion. 
 
3.5 Fishery management 
Different management tools are used in order to achieve sustainable stock level. 
Traditionally the management tools for fisheries are divided into two groups 
depending on whether it affects catch (output) or fishing effort (input). Output 
control managements prescribes what and how much is allowed to be harvested and 
input control defines how, when and where to harvest. Output control includes total 
allowable catches (TAC), quotas, trip limits and size limitations, when input control 
includes closed seasons, fishing rights, protected areas and technological control on 
fishing vessels and gears (Morison, 2004). Indirect management tools, such as fees 
and subsidies, have been used alongside with output and input control. Indirect 
management tools aim to affect the cost structure of fishing and by that, setting the 
fishing effort to more desirable level. (Flaaten, 2011) 
Most of the EU’s commercial fish stocks are managed by fishing quotas (European 
Union, 2013). In fishing quotas, total allowable catch (TAC) is defined for each 
stock and total catch is set low enough to allow population to recover. After this, the 
TAC is often divided to each fishing unit and each fishing unit is not allowed to fish 
more than their share of the TAC. Individual fishing quotas can be transferable and 
sellable, thus owners of the fishing units face an optimization problem, whether to 
sell their quotas or use them for themselves. Under the fishing quotas, fishers no 
longer compete catches with each other since they are guaranteed to receive a certain 
proportion of the catch, which allows them to make rational economic decisions of 
their fishing strategy (Beddington et al., 2007). Ideally, fishers who do not have 
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proper economic conditions to fish, will sell their quotas and the ones who remains, 
are fishing economically optimal manner. (Clark, 2007) 
Fishing quotas have also received some critique. It is obvious that there is incentive 
to catch more than quota allows and adequate enforce must be in place to prevent 
illegal fishing. Although, the peer pressure might prevent some of the biggest misuse 
of the quota, since overexploitation by one fisher is harmful for all. Fishers have also 
economic incentive to fill their quota only with most valuable fishes and therefore 
discard all small-sized and undervalued fishes. Excessive discard may result to a 
higher fishing mortality than originally was planned, and in some cases, these 
discarded by-catches can be largely overexploited. Fairness of quota allocation has 
also been questioned since quotas are valuable assets and it is hard to justify, why the 
common resource is divided only with a selected group. (Clark, 2007) 
Ye et al. (2013) state that only solution for achieving sustainable catch level, is to 
limit fishing activity of the fleets. One already used solution is the buy-back 
programs, where the vessels are bought from the fishers and eventually scrapped. 
Objective of the program is to lower exploitation pressure by reducing vessel 
number, which lead to stock recovery and increasing resource rent. In order buy-back 
programs to work, licences and vessels must be registered properly, and market 
access must be regulated, otherwise new vessels would replace vessels that were 
pulled of the market and total number of vessels would remain unchanged. Likewise, 
to ensure efficiency of the program, licences should be bought along with the vessels, 
otherwise licences will be sold to other vessel and the total catch would remain 
untouched (FAO, 2006). However, Clark (2007) argued that buy-back program 
would fall short from its objective because fishermen are willing to sell only the least 
effective vessels, leaving total fishing capacity largely intact. Secondly, the buy-back 
programs do not change the economic incentives which originally led to 
overcapacity, and for that reason, fishing effort will most likely increase after the 
buy-backs (Clark, 2007). 
At some cases, the best management alternative is to affect the profit function of 
fishing, by either increasing costs or decreasing revenue. Regulator can use 
Pigouvian taxes for either effort or harvest control, to adjust the fishing effort to the 
optimal level. In order to find the tax rate, which leads to optimal effort level, 
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regulator needs an extensive knowledge of biological and economic characteristics of 
the fishery. Obviously, it is hard to collect accurate data since fishers are not usually 
willing to reveal their numbers, and the parameter estimation process is not free of 
uncertainties. However, every tax rate, also those that are lower than the optimum, 
will move the equilibrium to the sustainable direction, even though the optimum 
level might not be reached. (Clark, 2007) 
A lot has been written about landing fees and quota controls. Particularly interesting 
research subject has been to examine, under which circumstances regulator should 
select quotas over fees, and vice versa. According to Hansen and Jensen (2017), fees 
are more suitable alternative than quotas if ecological uncertainty dominates or if 
there is uncertainty in variable economic, such as in fish prices. However, quotas 
should be selected over fees if there is uncertainty in structural economic, for 
example in profit function parameters. 
Much discussed topic in today’s fishery politics is the removal of the harmful 
subsidies. Subsidies for profit improvement, by either lowering fishing costs or 
increasing revenue, are impairing the sustainability of fisheries because they lead to a 
bioeconomic equilibrium with a higher level of fishing effort and lower stock size 
(Beddington et al., 2007; Clark, 2007). The issue is significant enough that United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and FAO published 
joint report (UNCTAD-FAO, 2016) where they are giving their total support to 
international efforts to achieve a Sustainable Development Goal 14, which is 
exclusively dedicated to the conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas and 
marine resources. This SDG-14 includes specific target to prohibit those fishing 
subsidies that leads to overcapacity and overfishing (SDG-14.6). The joint report has 
been a focal dossier and good starting point for WTO discussions towards regulating 
fishing subsidies and it is already endorsed by 90 countries (FAO, 2018). 
 
3.6 Rebuilding fishery 
Many fish stock is exploited at rates that are not capable of delivering the MSY and 
thus, world’s fishing industry is losing potential economic benefits. Several studies 
have highlighted the fact that potential profits of global fisheries could be 
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considerably higher if stocks were exploited sustainably (Willman et al., 2009; 
Srinivasan et al., 2010; Crilly and Esteban, 2012; Sumaila et al., 2012; Ye et al., 
2013; Costello et al., 2016; Guillen et al., 2016; Hilborn and Costello, 2018). Hilborn 
and Costello (2018) estimated that global fisheries yields could potentially increase 
by about 13-17% from 2012 levels, with better management strategy. They identified 
from where (fishing underutilized stocks more intensively or rebuilding 
overexploited stocks) the potential increase in yield could come on different part of 
the world. Interestingly, those areas that manage their fisheries intensively such as 
Europe and North-East Pacific could increase their yield mostly by exploiting 
underutilized stocks more comprehensively. Costello et al. (2016) calculated that 
global catch would increase from 80 million tonnes to 98 million tonnes if all stocks 
would be managed as MSY. Guillen et al. (2016) used surplus production model to 
estimate the potential profit for the EU fleet operating in the Northeast Atlantic 
waters and according to their results, effort needs to be reduced 38% to achieve 
healthy and profitable state of the stocks. They estimate that operating profit of EU 
fleet would increase from €0.1 billion to €4.64 billion if biomass of all stocks could 
recover and harvest would follow MSY. Operating profit would rise to €4.91 billion 
if fisheries were managed at MEY. 
Crilly and Esteban’s (2012) results were in line with previous studies, when they 
stated that fishers would gain potentially higher economic rents if Northeast Atlantic 
stocks would be restored to MSY. However, their work was different from others in 
a sense that they paid attention to social costs that occurs when fish stocks are 
rebuild. They estimate that €10.56 billion is lost in transition period (9.4 years) due 
to lower fishing effort. This economic loss can be seen as an investment for 
rebuilding the global fish stock. The investment is profitable already in transition 
period, since return on investment in that period is 148%. The return on investment is 
even higher after 40 years of rebuilt, for every Euro invested, 14 is returned. Crilly 
and Esteban (2012) suggest that the fastest way to move forward is to engage private 
sector into process and they believe that the return of investment is already in an 
adequate level to attract private investors. Willman et al. (2009) also noted that 
investments are required in order to guarantee smooth and fair transition to 
economically healthy fish stocks. Public funds have been often used to support 
fishers for abandoning the profession (e.g. buyback programs and early retirement 
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packages) but public money can achieve only limited results and therefore private 
investments are desperately needed. 
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4 Methods and objectives 
Objective of this study is to estimate the value of the European Union’s potential fish 
landing in the Northeast Atlantic. Fish stocks are right now managed in too short-
sightedly, and because of that, EU is unable to take full advantage of the true 
potential of the stocks. It is well known, that healthier fish stocks combined to 
sustainable harvest levels could provide more landings and increase profits in long 
term. Aim of this study is to define how much additional economic benefits would be 
provided if the Northeast Atlantic stocks would be managed sustainably.  
EU fleets are currently operating inefficiently in terms of both catch and profit, and 
the growth potential of EU’s wild capture production in Northeast Atlantic were 
calculated. Study compares current production and theoretically maximal production, 
which is determined by assuming that all fish stocks could provide Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) at the same time and effort level of the fleet is reduced to a 
level where catching MSY is possible. Study compares different rebuilding pathways 
to achieve collective MSY by calculating rebuilding time and net present value for 
each pathway. This study also views seafood production as a whole and provides 
rough estimation of combined production of aquaculture and wild capture in 
Northeast Atlantic. 
The study takes an example of paper published by Guillen et al. (2016) and objective 
is to follow their study in order to see at which direction have the Northeast Atlantic 
fish stocks developed and have the EU’s position changed in relation to MSY. To 
ensure comparable results, method of this study follows the method of Guillen et al. 
(2016). They used regular Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model to interpret the 
fisheries growth in equilibrium and outside of the equilibrium, they adapted formulas 
from Pella, (1967) Schnute, (1977) and Prager (1994). Guillen et al. (2016) used 
European Total Allowable Catch (TAC) landings and data of different species’ 
MSYs to form aggregated production curve of Northeast Atlantic fisheries. European 
potential fish landings value in Northeast Atlantic were determined from aggregated 
curve. 
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4.1 Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model 
Ecosystem services that benefit the people are restricted by the health of the natural 
capital. Profit and landing gained from fishery is dependent on the state of the stock. 
In this study, the Gordon-Schaefer model is used to determine state of the natural 
capital at each input level. 
The Gordon-Schaefer model is a bioeconomic model proposed by Schaefer (1954) 
and Gordon (1954) and it has become the standard framework of fisheries 
economics. The model is used for determining sustainable stock size and optimal 
harvesting effort to maximize long-term benefits of the resource. 
The model is presented here in three steps. First, the model is provided only from 
biological point of view, excluding all the prices and costs. Second, the economic 
part is added into the model and the stock is fished economically optimally, so 
fishers are maximising their common long-term profits of the stock. In third step, the 
economic part still exists in the model but now the stocks are assumed to be open-
access, where everyone can enter the market and every vessel is maximizing only its 
own profit. 
 
4.1.1 Biological optimum 
Biological growth function is the basic structure of the model and it is formed as: 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑟𝑥 (1 −
𝑥
𝐾
)   3 
where F(x) is the natural growth rate of the fish population, x is biomass, r is the 
intrinsic rate of natural population growth and K is the environmental carrying 
capacity for the population. Parameter r varies according to different species while K 
depends on natural characteristics of the habitat, both parameters are assumed to be 
fixed. Natural growth is acting according to equation (3), and it can be seen from the 
equation, that natural growth of a stock is positive until it exceeds the level of K. 
When x > K, the negative term inside the brackets is dominating and shifts growth to 
the downward trend. 
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Natural growth reaches its maximum in a specific stock level, which can be obtained 
by maximising F(x) with respect to x. Stock level, which maximize natural growth, 
produces the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and it can be found in a point where 
growth functions derivative is zero. When there is no harvesting, natural growth is 
maximised with stock size 𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦, which is formed as follows: 
𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦 =  
𝐾
2
    4 
The maximum growth can be further calculated by combining equations (3) and (4), 
which gives: 
𝐹(𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦) =  
𝑟𝐾
4
   5 
According to equation (5), the maximum sustainable growth for any given stock is a 
quarter of the multiplication of parameters r and K. 
The Gordon-Schaefer model does not only look at a natural growth but also adds the 
harvesting decision into equation. The model assumes that harvest will depend on the 
fishing effort, stock size and the catchability coefficient, as follows: 
ℎ = 𝑞𝐸𝑥    6 
where ℎ denotes harvest, q is the catchability coefficient, E is the fishing effort and x 
is stock size. The fishing effort describes how much resources have been allocated to 
fishing, for example number of vessels, efficiency of vessels and how many days 
those vessels have been out a sea (Perman et al., 2003). Different effectivity and 
technology of the fishing equipment are taken into account by the catchability 
coefficient. For example, trawlers will receive higher catch than boats equipped only 
with fishing rods and the catchability coefficient reflects this by giving higher value 
to more effective fishing gears. This study assumes that major technical 
improvements are not in sight, thus the catchability coefficient is assumed to be 
constant. Fishing effort is a decision variable and it can be changed based on fishers’ 
decisions. 
Stock change per unit as a function of time, can be defined by combining equations 
(3) and (6): 
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𝑑𝑋
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐹(𝑋) − ℎ   7 
where 
𝑑𝑋
𝑑𝑡
 is the temporal change in x, 𝐹(𝑋) is natural growth and ℎ is catch. 
Interrelation of the 𝐹(𝑋) and ℎ determines the growth of the stock. Stock increases 
when 𝐹(𝑋) > ℎ and decreases when 𝐹(𝑋) < ℎ. Stock achieve its biological 
equilibrium or steady state, when harvesting equals the net natural growth, 𝐹(𝑋) = ℎ. 
In this state, the harvesting can continue forever without causing any harm for a 
long-term steady state of the stock. Fish stock use is at sustainable state, when only 
the annual growth is harvested from the stock. Sustainable stock size and harvest 
level can be determined by using condition 𝐹(𝑋) = ℎ. By replacing the functions of 
𝐹(𝑋) and ℎ with equations (3) and (6), the function takes form of: 
𝑟𝑥 (1 −
𝑥
𝐾
) = 𝑞𝐸𝑥   8 
Sustainable stock level (𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦) can be determined from equation (8): 
𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦 = 𝐾 (1 −
𝑞𝐸
𝑟
)   9 
Equation (9) shows that sustainable stock size decreases when fishing effort 
increases. Sustainable harvest can be calculated by placing 𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦 from equation (9) to 
equation (6). Thus, the sustainable harvest level is derived as: 
ℎ𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝑞𝐸𝐾 (1 −
𝑞𝐸
𝑟
)  10 
The fishing effort that provides maximum sustainable harvest can be defined from 
equation (10). Fishing effort that maximise harvest is solved from derivation of 
equation (10) with respect to E. Thus, the optimal fishing effort is: 
𝐸𝑚𝑠𝑦 =  
𝑟
2𝑞
    11 
By placing 𝐸𝑚𝑠𝑦 to the equation (10), sustainable harvest is redefined as: 
ℎ𝑚𝑠𝑦 =  
𝑟𝐾
4
    12 
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4.1.2 Economic optimal harvest 
In this following chapter, the economic point of view is added to the model. 
Biological structure of the model is important to acknowledge but it is somehow 
theoretical and therefore economic parameters improve its usability. With prices and 
costs, the model can be used to describe real decision-making processes of fishers. 
The economic optimal harvesting model is based on three assumptions. First, the 
model assumes that fish price (p) is constant and fishers take the price as given, for 
example market price. The model also assumes that marginal cost of effort is 
constant, which is based on assumption that every vessel is added to the fishery at the 
same cost. Thirdly, the model assume that fish stock is owned by sole owner, for 
example State or EU, which controls the fishery in a way that economic benefits are 
maximised. 
Objective of the biological model was to maximise the size of the fish stock, while 
economic optimal harvest model is looking to find management strategy to maximise 
economic profits of the fish stock. Definition of optimal economic harvest starts from 
the resource rent maximisation problem:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝜋) = 𝑝ℎ − 𝑐𝐸   13 
where p is a fish price and c is a marginal cost. Equation (13) is a fisher profit 
function where the first term is the gross revenue of a fishery and the second term is 
the total cost of harvest. Economic optimal fishing effort can be estimated from 
equation (13) by combining it with equation (10) and then differentiating it with a 
respect of E. Fishing effort that maximise economic yield (𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑦) is then formed as: 
𝐸𝑚𝑒𝑦 =  
𝑟
2𝑞
(1 −
𝑐
𝑝𝑞𝐾
)   14 
Economically optimal fish stock size (𝑥𝑚𝑒𝑦) can then be estimated by combining 
equations (14) and (9), and it forms as: 
𝑥𝑚𝑒𝑦 =  
𝐾
2
+
𝑐
2𝑝𝑞
   15 
Economically optimal harvesting (ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑦) can be estimated by placing equations (15) 
and (14) to equation (6). When stock is fished economically, the optimal harvest is: 
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ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑦 =  
𝑟𝐾
4
−
𝑐2𝑟
4𝑝𝑞2𝐾
   16 
 
4.1.3 The open-access fishery 
The open-access fishery occurs because property rights are undefined and access to 
resource is open and free for all. In open-access, fishers maximise their individual 
short-term benefits, which leads to overexploitation of the stock. Gordon (1954) 
showed that in unregulated open-access fishery, competition for scarce resource 
continues until the point is reached, where total revenue equals total costs, thus the 
profit equals zero. Taking advantage of Gordon’s result, open-access fishery profit 
function is defined as: 
𝜋 =  𝑝ℎ − 𝑐𝐸 = 0   17 
The equation of fishing effort in open-access (𝐸𝑂𝐴) is formed the same way than in 
economic optimal harvest scenario. Equation (17) is combined with equation (10), 
from which the economic optimal fishing effort can be calculated. The open-access 
fishing effort is then: 
𝐸𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑟
𝑞
(1 −
𝑐
𝑝𝑞𝐾
)   18 
Open-access equilibrium stock size (𝑥𝑂𝐴) is defined by combining equations (9) and 
(18), it is formed as follows: 
𝑥𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑐
𝑝𝑞
    19 
Equilibrium harvest size (ℎ𝑂𝐴) can be calculated by combining equations (6), (19) 
and (18). Harvest in open-access is: 
ℎ𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑟𝑐
𝑝𝑞
(1 −
𝑐
𝑞𝐾
)   20 
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4.1.4 Summary of the Gordon-Schaefer model 
Unregulated open-access fishery will attract new vessels until opportunity cost2 is 
lower than profit from the fishery. This can be seen from the figure 3, where revenue 
of the yield is presented on a function of effort. In figure 3, fishing effort increases 
(new vessels enter the market) until fishing costs equals the revenue of the yield. 
Thus, the open-access equilibrium point of effort is settled to 𝐸𝑂𝐴 because after this 
point every extra effort will turn into negative profits. From the society point of 
view, it would be more favourable to lower the effort level, because it would provide 
higher economic rent for fishers with healthier fish stocks. Moving from 𝐸𝑂𝐴 to 𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑌 
or 𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑌, provides more catch, more profits and healthier stocks with less effort. In 
figure 3, profit is presented with the space that is left between cost line and yield 
curve and it is maximised in effort level 𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑌. Total catch in MEY is lower than in 
MSY but profits are higher because costs decrease more than yield when moving 
from 𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑌 to 𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑌. In MEY, total biomass size is greatest due to lowest effort level. 
 
 
Figure 3: Summary of the different management options. (adapted from Sumaila, 2001) 
 
                                                 
2 Profits that can be earned elsewhere in the economy. 
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The exact same results that were interpreted in figure 3 can be presented in algebra 
form by looking at the earlier presented equations. All equations that are needed to 
calculate the optimum levels in different management scenarios are represented in 
table 4. Comparing is intuitive between MSY and MEY, and by looking at the 
equations, it is clear that MEY leads to higher stock size with lower harvest and 
effort levels. It is not as straightforward to notice differences between open-access 
and MSY or MEY equations. However, numerical example would show that 
equilibrium point in open-access fishery is reached with higher effort and harvest 
levels and lower stock size. As a result, profits are notably lower in open-access than 
in MSY or MEY, thus, the world fish sector is not operating efficiently since 
potential economic rent is constantly lost because of too excessive fishing effort. 
Equations 21-24 gathers up and illustrate the comparisons between different 
variables in all three management scenarios. 
 
Table 4: Summary of the equations of Gordon-Schaefer model. 
 
 
𝐸𝑂𝐴 > 𝐸𝑀𝑆𝑌 > 𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑌   21 
ℎ𝑀𝑆𝑌 > ℎ𝑀𝐸𝑌 > ℎ𝑂𝐴   22 
𝑥𝑀𝐸𝑌 > 𝑥𝑀𝑆𝑌 > 𝑥𝑂𝐴   23 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐸𝑌 > 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑆𝑌 > 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑂𝐴  24 
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4.2 Analysis outside of the equilibrium 
The Gordon-Schaefer model works only when analysis is moving along the 
equilibrium curve. However, fish stocks are usually somewhere else than on an 
equilibrium curve, especially when stocks are tried to rebuild. MSY equilibrium 
point represent maximum sustainable harvest but it requires time before the fish 
stock is revived to a state where the MSY can be collected. In steady state, the 
system is in equilibrium, so at the certain harvest level the biomass of the stock 
remains constant because harvest equals annual growth. In order to rebuild the stock, 
the effort must be kept under the current equilibrium level, otherwise growth does 
not occur. The Gordon-Schaefer model defines variables in different equilibrium 
points, but it does not illustrate how long it will take to rebuild the stock and which is 
the optimal pathway to get there. 
Pella (1967), Schnute (1977) and Prager (1994) have developed the equation of the 
dynamics in situation where harvesting effort does not match the equilibrium level 
(
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
≠ 0). From those three studies, Guillen et al. (2016) have formed aggregated 
equations to model rebuilding process of the fish stocks. It is formed as follow: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑞𝐸𝑡𝐾
ln 𝛼𝑡
𝑟
   25 
being 𝛼𝑡 = [1 −
𝑟𝑥𝑡(1−𝑒
𝑟−𝑞𝐸𝑡)
𝐾(𝑟−𝑞𝐸𝑡)
]  26 
ℎ𝑡 is the harvest and 𝐸𝑡 is the effort level, with both respect to time t. 𝑥𝑡 stands for 
the biomass at the beginning of the period t. ℎ𝑡 gives a growth curve which is 
asymptotic at 𝑥𝑡. Because of that, the mean biomass ?̅? in period t is: 
𝑥?̅? = 𝐾
ln 𝛼𝑡
𝑟
    27 
Equation (25) can also be formed as follows: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑞𝐸𝑡𝑥?̅?    28 
To calculate the rebuilding time, the biomass at the end of the period t is calculated 
as: 
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𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡
𝑒𝑟−𝑞𝐸𝑡
𝛼𝑡
   29 
 
4.3 Profit function of the model 
Operating profit is calculated by the difference between value of landing and total 
cost, as equation (30) show: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝑉𝐿 − 𝑇𝐶   30 
where VL is the value of landing and TC stands for total costs. In this study, the total 
costs of harvesting (TC) are assumed to be a linear function of the effort. In the other 
words, the marginal cost of effort is assumed constant. This cost method is simplified 
approach and it assumes that every vessel’s cost structure is identical, which means 
that vessel is added to the fishery at the same cost than every other vessel. The total 
harvesting costs depends on the effort level as follows: 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑐𝐸     31 
where c is the costs per unit of harvesting effort. The effort cost of harvesting (c) is 
obtained by summing all current cost components of the EU’s Northeast Atlantic 
fleet and dividing it with a current effort level. Cost components that were taken 
account are cost of the crew wage (crew), estimates of unpaid labour (unpaid), 
energy cost (energy), other variable cost (other-variable), other non-variable cost 
(other-non-variable), depreciation (depreciation) and repair and maintenance 
(repair&maintenance). 
𝑐 =
crew + unpaid + energy + othervar + othernonvar
+depreciation + repair𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
 32 
Revenues that fishing provides is calculated by multiplying total harvest with fish 
price. Thus, the value of landing is defined as: 
𝑉𝐿 = 𝑝ℎ    33 
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where 𝑝 is price of fish and ℎ is the amount of harvest. The price of the fish is the 
average price of the fish, which is calculated by dividing the Northeast Atlantic’s 
total landing value with the total landing weight. 
 
4.4 Forming collective MSY of the Northeast Atlantic stocks 
Objective of the study is to estimate how much extra profits could be achieved if 
Northeast Atlantic fish stocks could be in state, where all of them can deliver MSY. 
The extra profit is estimated by the difference between current operating profit and 
operating profit in situation where all fish stocks are at MSY. Estimated MSY levels 
are taken from the literature (Merino et al., 2014; ICES, 2013; Guillen et al, 2013), 
unfortunately estimates are only available for a scarce number of species (S) and 
areas (Z). Guillen et al. (2016) have developed equation, which estimates potential 
landing value when MSY of all stocks could not be determined. In the equation, 
those stocks that have required information available (𝑀𝑆𝑌𝑆,𝑍) are multiplied with the 
price of the species and summed together. In order to determine the potential landing 
value, the summed factor is then multiplied by a ratio of total EU landings value and 
EU TAC landings value. The idea is to estimate all of the Northeast Atlantic fish 
stocks MSY by assuming that the unknown fish stocks are behaving relatively same 
way as the stocks where MSY is known. The approach simplifies the complex 
problem but gives relatively good estimate of the Northeast Atlantic fish stock’s 
MSY. Thus, the potential landing value is estimated as: 
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = ∑(𝑀𝑆𝑌𝑆,𝑍 ∗  𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆,𝑍) ∗  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑈 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑈 𝑇𝐴𝐶 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
 34 
where 𝑀𝑆𝑌𝑆,𝑍 is MSY for the species S in region Z and 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑆,𝑍 is the price of the 
species S in region Z. Potential landing value corresponds the MSY of all the fish 
stocks in Northeast Atlantic. 
The logistic production function (equation 10) gives harvest level (h) in a function of 
effort (E). Production function is fully defined when three of its points are known. 
First known point is the current value of landing and the effort level in Northeast 
Atlantic, which are obtained from the STECFs Annual Economic Report on the EU 
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Fishing Fleet (STECF, 2018a). Second known point is origin (0,0) since harvest is 
zero with zero effort. Third and final known point is the calculated potential landing 
value, which is the maximum point of the curve. With these three points, the curve 
can be defined and illustrated, since it is downward opening quadratic equation. 
The logistic production function curve combines all Northeast Atlantic fish stocks, 
and parameters (r, K, q and 𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦) which are modelling the behaviour of aggregated 
Northeast Atlantic fish stock, can be defined from the curve. Intrinsic rate of natural 
population growth (r), the environmental carrying capacity (K), the catchability 
coefficient (q) and sustainable stock level (𝑥𝑚𝑠𝑦) can be calculated based on the 
curve. These parameters are further used to determine the changes in whole 
Northeast Atlantic fish stocks. Equations to calculate the parameters is presented in 
Annex 1. 
 
4.5 Management points and alternative pathways to rebuild stocks 
With method described above, four different management points were identified. 
Revenues, costs, efforts and profits of different management points were calculated. 
Different management points were then compared with each other in order to 
observe the differences between the points. Analysed four points are: 
1) Point where MEY is collected (MEY) 
2) Point where MSY is collected (MSY) 
3) Point where EU fleet are currently (Current) 
4) Open-access equilibrium point (Open-Access) 
 
Second part of the analysis search for optimal rebuilding strategy to reach MSY for 
the Northeast Atlantic fish stocks. Eight different management scenarios were 
created for rebuilding the Northeast Atlantic’s stocks and different options were 
compared by calculating rebuilding time and net present value. Used time 
perspective were 2019-2050. This study looks to rebuild the stocks to level where 
MSY is produced, and optimal effort level is the one which match the effort level of 
MSY. Defined management scenarios were created as follows: 
1) Business as usual - effort level stays at current effort level (Current) 
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2) Optimum effort level is reached in the first year (MSY-2020) 
3) Optimum effort level is reached in 2024, until that point effort level stays at 
current level (MSY-2024) 
4) Effort level is reduced evenly in first five years and it reaches optimum level 
in 2024 (MSY-2024 phased) 
5) Optimum effort level is reached in 2029, until that point effort level stays at 
current level (MSY-2029) 
6) Effort level is reduced evenly in first ten years and it reaches optimum level 
in 2029 (MSY-2029 phased) 
7) Incentive scheme is introduced. Fishers are offered money to leave the 
industry. Vessels number is reduced to optimal level and needed number of 
vessels will be pulled out of the market in first year. Total cost of the scheme 
is allocated to first year. (Incentive-2020) 
8) Incentive scheme is introduced. Fishers are offered money to leave the 
industry. Vessels number is reduced evenly in first five years and it reaches 
optimal level in 2024. Costs of the scheme is allocated evenly to the first five 
years. (Incentive-2024) 
 
4.6 Data 
Numbers to represent the EU’s fishing industry in Northeast Atlantic were obtained 
from the annual report of Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
Fisheries (2018a) and numbers can be seen in table 5. 
 
Table 5: Summary of the STECF Annual Economic Report of EU Fishing Fleet (presented in 
millions). Data is from 2018 report and represents 2016 numbers. (STECF, 2018a) 
Total EU landings in Northeast Atlantic (tonnes) 3775.5 
Landing value (€) 4975.2 
Crew wage costs (€) 1517.6 
Unpaid labor (€) 158.8 
Energy costs (€) 528.5 
Repair costs (€) 493.6 
Other variable costs (€) 640.7 
Other non-variable costs (€) 375.1 
Annual depreciation (€) 411.8 
Total costs (€) 4126.1 
Operating profit (€) 849.1 
Number of EU vessels in the Northeast Atlantic 26047.0 
Mean price (€/kg) 1.3 
Average buy-back cost per vessel (€ thousand) (Calvo et al. 
2015) 
218.5 
43 
 
 
To ensure the validity of the data, the numbers were compared to FAO equivalent 
numbers. TACs numbers were obtained from the decisions of the Council of the 
European Union (2016). The yields corresponding of the MSY were obtained from 
the literature (Merino et al., 2014; ICES, 2013; Guillen et al, 2013). 
Average price of the seafood was defined from the STECF report (2018a) by 
dividing the value of landings by the landing weight in the Northeast Atlantic. Total 
cost was estimated from the STECF report (2018a) by summing total fishing cost for 
the EU landings in the Northeast Atlantic. Average buy-back cost per vessel were 
adapted from Calvo et al. (2015) research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Management points 
Figure 4 presents aggregated fishing data from Northeast Atlantic and it shows the 
value of landing, operating profit and costs in monetary terms as a function of effort. 
Figure’s effort level is scaled in a way that current fishing effort is set to 1 and effort 
level decrease towards origin. Effort level defined this way is called relative effort 
level. Four management points are marked in the figure (Current, Open-access, MSY 
and MEY) and calculated long-term values of each point are listed in table 6.  
The current point represents the state where EU’s fishing fleet are in this point in 
time in the Northeast Atlantic. Currently the profit of the EU’s fishing fleet in 
Northeast Atlantic is €0.85 billion and it is not far away from the open-access 
equilibrium point since relative effort level that leads to open-access is 1.04. It means 
that only 4% increase to the current effort level would lead to open-access 
equilibrium and zero profits. 
 
 
Figure 4: Value of landing, costs and operating profit as a function of effort for the EU fleet in the 
Northeast Atlantic. 
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It is easy to make conclusion from the figure 4, that current state of fish stocks in 
Northeast Atlantic are far away from producing MSY or MEY. In order fish stocks to 
produce MSY, the relative effort level should be dropped to 0.62, at that effort level 
the long-term profit would be €5.28 billion. Profits of the stocks are maximized in 
MEY (€5.49 billion), which is reached in relative effort level 0.52. Difference 
between MSY and MEY is not huge but still notable, since annual profit in MEY 
would be €0.21 billion more than in MSY. 
Based on result of this study, the EU’s fishing fleet would get €4.43 billion more 
profit if Northeast Atlantic fish stocks were exploited in a way that it is capable of 
deliver MSY and the gained profits would be even higher if the stocks could deliver 
MEY. However, effort level should be decreased significantly in order Northeast 
Atlantic stocks to revive to the MSY level. Effort level should be decreased 38% to 
reach the effort level that matches the MSY. 
 
Table 6: Landing value, cost, profit and relative effort level for four alternative management schemes. 
All monetary values are in billion euros. 
 Relative 
effort level 
Landing value Costs Profit 
MEY 0.52 7.64 2.15 5.49 
MSY 0.62 7.85 2.57 5.28 
Current 1.00 4.98 4.13 0.85 
Open-
access 
1.04 4.30 4.30 0.00 
 
5.2 Rebuilding the stocks 
It is undeniable that EU fleet would receive higher profits if all the stocks would be 
at MSY or MEY. Fishing effort must be reduced below its current state of 
equilibrium to stocks to recover. Referring to figure 4, moving from current point 
towards MSY, fish landing should be lower than equilibrium catch for a certain 
period in order stocks to revive. After the effort level is dropped to match the effort 
level of MSY, catch could be increased slowly year by year until the MSY is 
reached. It is impossible to catch MSY immediately, even if the effort level is 
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reduced to match the MSY, since fish stock demand time to reproduce. It depends on 
each fish’s characteristics and the fishing effort, how long it takes to stocks to 
rebuild. 
In figure 5, an example of one pathway to rebuild Northeast Atlantic fish stocks is 
presented. Fishing effort is reduced to match the relative effort level of MSY within 
five years and the reduction is evenly distributed over each of the first five years. 
Graph a) shows the optimal harvesting path towards MSY. In first three years, the 
effort reduction leads to lower catch but already in fourth year, the catch exceeds the 
current amount, even though the effort is reduced by 30%. Optimal effort level is 
reached in fifth year, after that the catch increases slowly until the MSY is reached. 
Graph b) demonstrates the time that it will take to rebuild the Northeast Atlantic 
stocks. According to the calculations, stocks can deliver 99% of the MSY at 
beginning of the 13th year of the rebuilding process.  
 
 
Figure 5: Example of the one rebuilding pathway. Fishing effort is steadily reduced in five years to 
match the MSY level of effort. 
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Graphs c) illustrates the biomass change on a function of effort. Effort is reduced to 
level of MSY in 5 years and biomass starts to grow immediately after reduction of 
effort. Graph d) shows how many years it will took before biomass reaches the MSY 
level. The biomass level that can produce MSY is reached at the same time as level 
of MSY and in that sense; it is obvious that 99% of the MSY biomass level is met 
after 13th year. 
 
5.3 Optional pathways to rebuild the stocks 
In the previous section, one example was provided for the rebuilding pathway 
towards optimal state of the Northeast Atlantic fish stocks. In this section, four other 
optional pathways are added into the analysis, which are compared with each other. 
All management strategies are already presented in the chapter 4. Net present value 
provides effective tool to compare alternative options, since it takes into account all 
of the futures profits and discount them into the present value. Discount rate used is 
3%. Rebuilding time is also calculated for each alternative pathway. 
Figures 6 and 7 present the results of different rebuilding pathways. Highest net 
present value (€93.04 billion) is gained when optimum effort level is adapted in first 
year. Second highest net present value (€85.90 billion) is collected when effort level 
decreases steadily and reaches optimal level in fifth year. The third (MSY-2029-
phased) and the fourth (MSY-2024) highest net present value are close together, with 
only €0.16 billion difference. The smallest net present value (€58.72 billion) is 
gained when current effort level is kept until 2029 and after that, the effort level is 
reduced to optimal.  
Figure 7 reveals rebuilding times and annual profits for each management strategy. 
Stocks have fully recovered when maximum annual profit in MSY (€5.28 billion) 
can be collected. Fastest rebuilding time is on MSY-2020 and MSY-2024-phased, 11 
and 13 years, respectively. MSY-2024’s rebuilding time is not too far from the first 
two, since it will take 15 years for MSY-2024 to get stocks to produce MSY. Longest 
rebuilding time is 21 years and it belongs to management strategy MSY-2029. 
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Figure 6: Net present value of different MSY pathways. Period under review 2019-2050. 
 
 
Figure 7: Annual profits and rebuilding time of different MSY pathways. 
 
Management strategies are slightly different compared to each other, but it should be 
noted, that even if the optimal effort level is reached as late as in 2029, it is still 
much better than continue on current path. Net present values are multiple times 
higher in all scenarios, then generated net present value if the Northeast Atlantic 
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fisheries will continue to be fished at current effort level. Generally, the faster the 
effort level is dropped to the optimal, the faster the stock is rebuilt and higher are the 
generated net present value. This is true in all other management options except 
between MSY-2029-phased and MSY-2024. MSY-2029-phased reach the profit 
level of MSY two years later than MSY-2024, but still its net present value is slightly 
greater. 
 
5.4 Incentive to leave the industry 
Previous parts of this study highlighted the immediate need for improvements of 
Northeast Atlantic fish stocks. Until this point, the analysis has not offered any actual 
tools of how the rebuilding process could be done and what are the short-term 
incentives for the fishers to decrease effort and why they would accept lower profits 
for certain period of time. These are the important questions because often fishers are 
in a situation, where they are not able to fish less, since their income level does not 
allow it and they might have family that have to be supported. Fishermen understand 
the benefits of rebuilding, but they do not know whether reducing their individual 
fishing effort would lead to healthier fish stocks or merely increase the catches of 
others. 
Providing incentive to leave the industry could potentially tackle some of the above-
mentioned issues and provide effective tool to reduce effort level. This study 
assumes that every vessel is identical, means that every vessel pulled of the market 
will reduce effort a same amount. Average incentive to leave the industry per vessel 
is adapted from the study of Calvo et al. (2015) and value being used is €218.5 
thousand per vessel. Currently 26 047 vessels are operating in the Northeast Atlantic 
which stands for effort level 1. Since MSY effort level is 0.6232, optimal number of 
vessels should thus be around 38 percent less than it currently is. Number of vessels 
that corresponds optimal effort level is 16 232, which means that vessels should be 
reduced by 9815 units. Given the incentive of €218.5 thousand per vessel, total cost 
would be €2.144 billion. 
This study creates two alternative incentive scenarios. In the first scenario, 9815 
vessels are agreeing the incentive and leaving the market in first year, meaning that 
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the effort level is optimal immediately in first year, and total cost of the incentive 
program is allocated to the first year. In the second scenario, incentive program is not 
that attractive to fishers and optimal number of vessels are reduced from the industry 
evenly over the first five years. Effort level decreases gradually towards optimal and 
costs are divided evenly over the first five years. 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the results of the two incentive scenarios. Figure 8 presents 
net present values for both incentive scenarios and for comparison, net present value 
of the current state is represented. Figure 9 shows how the annual profits are 
developing towards maximum profit level (€5.28 billion). Results shows that net 
present value is higher in first scenario (€90.96 billion) than in second (€83.93 
billion). Result are in line with theoretical pathways towards MSY, which were 
represented in previous section, since the scenario 1 reaches optimal effort level 
earlier than scenario 2, and thus net present value is higher with the option 1. 
 
 
Figure 8: Net present value of the two incentive programs and current state. Period under review 
2019-2050. 
 
Annual profit development and rebuilding time can be observed from the figure 9. 
When all required vessels are bought back in first year, it affects dramatically to the 
firsts year’s profit. In first year, profit is over €1 billion negative due to incentive 
costs that were allocated to the first year. Profits bounce back to positive after the 
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first year and second year’s profit is €1.86 billion. Rebuilding time of the incentive-
2020 program is 11 years, in that time annual profit correspond 99 percent of the 
maximum annual profit. Second program, where vessels are bought in five-year 
period, can generate positive profit in every year. Profits decreases under the current 
state in first and second year (first €0.47 billion; second €0.73 billion; current €0.85 
billion) but the third year is already more profitable than current situation (€1.09 
billion). Rebuilding time of the incentive-2024 program is 13 years. 
Both incentive programs could generate more than 4.5 times greater net present value 
than stocks in their current form could, if the fishing is continued until 2050. 
Incentive programs could provide effective management tool for control the fish 
stocks, but the problem is to find adequate funding for the program. 
 
 
Figure 9: Annual profits of incentive programs. 
 
5.5 Potential value and yield of all seafood production 
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and fish-based diet could provide viable option to that problem (Garcia and 
Rosenberg, 2010; Bene et al., 2015). It is highly unlikely that wild capture could 
meet the future demand of fish and aquaculture is considered as the only solution to 
fill the gap between supply and demand of fish in the future (Garcia and Grainger 
2005).  
When analysing value and production of the seafood, the result will fall short if 
aquaculture is excluded from the review. Aquaculture production is not restricted by 
nature’s carrying capacity, thus the maximum production level is harder to define. 
According to STECF economic report of the EU aquaculture sector (STECF, 2018b), 
member states are expecting on average, that aquaculture sector will grow 39% 
between 2013 and 2023, which would mean around 3% annual growth. At the same 
report, five other estimations for aquaculture production growth are shown, which 
were conducted by European parliament, FAO, OECD and collaboration between 
Thünen-Institute and Wageningen University – in all these estimations annual 
growth will fall within the range of zero and four percent. 
In this study, different annual growth rates are used for estimating futures 
aquaculture production in Europe. Selected annual growth rates are following the 
growth rates introduced in economic report of the EU aquaculture sector (STECF, 
2018b) and they are varying between 0 and 5%. Annual growth rate might be hard to 
understand but with 1% growth per year, aquaculture production would be one third 
larger in 2050 compared today. Five percent annual growth rate would mean, that 
aquaculture production would be over four times greater in 2050 than currently and 
that represent highly ambitious goal in this study. 
Figures 10 and 11 are visualizing the potential of Northeast Atlantic seafood 
production. Figure 10 shows how large quantity of seafood could potentially be 
gained from the wild capture and aquaculture with in a next 30 years. Figure 11 
presents the potential value of the wild capture and aquaculture seafood in Northeast 
Atlantic. In both pictures, it is assumed that optimal effort level of wild capture is 
reached after 5 years. 
Figure 10 illustrate that Northeast Atlantic seafood production’s long-term 
equilibrium state is 7.06 million tonnes, assuming there will be no growth in 
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aquaculture sector in the future. If aquaculture sector will face 1% annual growth, 
total quantity of seafood would be 7.46 million tonnes. With growth rates 3 and 5%, 
quantity would be 8.72 and 10.98 million tonnes, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 10: Potential production of total seafood in EU (wild capture and aquaculture). 
 
 
Figure 11: Potential value of total seafood production in EU (wild capture and aquaculture). 
Figure 11 provides illustration of development of the potential landing value of the 
wild capture and aquaculture. Dispersion of the different estimations is greater with 
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value than in case of quantity. Landing value would be €11.71 billion when 
aquaculture stays at current level and €13.10 billion if annual growth rate of 
aquaculture is 1 %. Landing value grows to €17.50 billion when three percent growth 
is being observed and €25.38 billion if annual growth rate climbs to 5%. 
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6 Discussion 
European Commission admits in the initiative that propose new regulations for 
fisheries management in EU waters (European Commission, 2015), that changes 
must be introduced for multi-annual plans if fish stocks are to be revived to a level 
capable of delivering MSY, which is the final objective of the common fisheries 
policy (CFP). In that paper, European Commission state that current actions have 
been inadequate since majority of the fish stocks are overfished. According to the 
report, fishing industry and related industries do not reach their full potential in terms 
of economics, environmental and social welfare because stocks are overexploited. 
Similar findings were made in this study than European Commission made in their 
above-mentioned initiative. The results of this study show that EU fleet in Northeast 
Atlantic are still far away from reaching level where MSY or MEY would be 
delivered and reduction in fishing effort is inevitable action in order to reach the 
objective. 
According to this study, effort level should be dropped by 38% in order to achieve 
MSY in long run, and by 48% to match the level of the MEY. Rebuilding the stocks 
to MSY by effort reduction, would lift generated landing value by €2.87 billion 
(€2.66 billion in MEY) while the fishing costs would drop by €1.56 billion (€1.98 
billion in MEY). Rebuilding the fishery to a level where all the stocks are able to 
produce MSY or MEY, would increase profits by increasing landing value and 
decreasing costs. If effort level were placed to match the MEY effort level, the 
operating profit would be €5.49 billion, which means that profit would increase 
€4.64 billion compared to current situation. If effort were placed to match the MSY 
effort level, the operating profit would be €5.28 billion, which means that profit 
would be €4.43 billion more than currently. It is noteworthy how large proportion of 
the increased profit is due to cost reduction and how much due to stock rebuild. The 
ratio is closer to 50/50 in MEY, where 57% of the gained profit is due to stock 
rebuild and 43% from cost reduction. In MSY, 65% of the newly generated profit is 
coming from increased landing and 35% from cost reduction. 
At current position, EU fleet in Northeast Atlantic are generating €0.85 billion profit 
(landing value €4.98 billion, costs €4.13 billion). In the current situation, the 
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Northeast Atlantic fish stocks are much closer to be at open-access equilibrium point 
than reaching MSY or MEY (see figure 4). Profits generated from the Northeast 
Atlantic fishery would decrease to zero if effort level would increase by 4%, in that 
point, landing value and costs would both be €4.30 billion. The situation can be seen 
as highly alarming, considering how much closer the current point is to open-access 
than MSY. 
In this study, several management strategies for rebuilding the Northeast Atlantic 
stocks were introduced. Rebuilding time and net present value were calculated for 
each management strategy. In calculations, stocks were fully recovered, when they 
could provide 99% of the full potential and time period for net present value 
calculations were 31 years (2019-2050) with 3% interest rate. The results clearly 
address that it is preferable to decrease effort level as soon as possible to match the 
effort level of MSY. The sooner the optimum effort level is reached, the shorter is 
the rebuilding time and the higher is the net present value in next 31 years. Only 
exception of this rule is MSY-2029-phased because its net present value is greater 
than MSY-2024 even though the rebuilding time is longer. 
There are two reasons why it is more profitable to decrease effort level fast compared 
to rebuilding stocks in longer period. Firstly, it instantly reduces costs, which leads to 
increased profits already in first year, even though the yield is lower than currently in 
first two years. Secondly, the stocks can revive only when effort level is reduced, so 
it is optimal to achieve MSY effort level fast, in order to gain benefits from the 
growing stocks earlier. The combination of those two factors are generating the 
incentive to lower the effort level sooner. In turn, the rapid decline in the effort level 
is generating trade-offs, since it would mean that large number of former fishers 
would be forced to find new earning opportunities from somewhere else. However, 
the problem is not necessarily that massive, because it can be assumed that new jobs 
will eventually be created in different part of the fish supply chain (for example 
cutting and packaging) because of the growing catch. However, the impacts could be 
dramatic in the short term. 
This study follows the same pattern as study contacted by Guillen et al. (2016). One 
aim of the study was to observe at which direction has the state of the Northeast 
Atlantic fish stocks shifted over the past three years. Table 7 provides results of this 
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study and Guillen et al. (2016) study in a comparable format. Table 7a shows the 
results of Guillen et al. (2016) and table 7b presents the result of this study. 
 
Table 7a&b: Comparison of the results. All monetary values are in billion euros. 
 
 
It can be noted from the table 7 a and b, that the state of the Northeast Atlantic stocks 
has moved slightly towards MSY in past three years, since difference between 
current point and open-access point has grown slightly (from 0.5% to 4%). However, 
the distance between current point and MSY (or MEY) point are almost the same in 
both studies. Northeast Atlantic fish stocks could now provide more economic 
wealth than at the time when Guillen et al. (2016) conducted their study. Profits have 
grown in all three management option points and potential profit in MSY point is 
€0.64 billion more than three years ago. Profits in current point has grown 
significantly since Guillen et al. (2016) study, currently EU fleet are earning €0.75 
billion more from the Northeast Atlantic than three years ago. 
Profits have increased and it is due to lower costs and higher landing value. In three 
years, costs have dropped from €4.41 billion to €4.13 billion and landing value 
increased from €4.51 billion to €4.98 billion. However, costs and landing value have 
not changed in same proportion. Major part of the profit increase is coming from 
landing value, for example in MSY, 75% of the profit growth comes from increased 
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landing value. The ratio is more even in current point but still landing value is 
dominating with 63% of the profit growth. 
There are some simplifications in the model, which should be highlighted. Firstly, it 
is not ecologically possible to maintain all fish stocks at a level of MSY at the same 
time (Ye et al., 2013). Actual collective maximum production of the fish stocks may 
be lower than sum of the species-specific MSYs. That is because of the trophic 
dynamics of the ecosystem, which means that the recovery of some fish stocks could 
adversely affect other stocks, so that they no longer can produce MSY. Secondly, 
approach of this study takes into account only commercially fished stocks and 
exclude stocks that are not fished at all or fished recreationally. Thirdly, this study 
does not include externalities into the analysis. Economic valuation of externalities 
falls outside of the scope of this study because most of them are non-market and for 
that reason, valuing them would have required more time and resources that was in 
use. Fourthly, for simplification, this study calculates only the boat owner’s profits 
and overlooks the added value of which this economic activity is generating to the 
whole society. Calculating cross value added would generate a better overall picture 
of the situation because it would sum up e.g. paid taxes, crew remuneration and 
interests on loans. 
By now, the ecosystem service concept has been widely accepted and adapted in 
different field of a science. However, process of applying the ecosystem service 
concept to the marine research has been relatively slow, mainly because of data 
scarcity. Marine ecosystem service studies represent only 9% of the all ecosystem 
service literature, even though marines cover more than 70% of the earth’s surface. 
Clear difference is revealed when marine ecosystem service research is compared to 
the terrestrial counterparts. In 2015, 400 articles with title of ‘ecosystem services’ 
were related to terrestrial field and only bit over 50 were related to marines. In that 
sense, more research is needed on marine ecosystem services and their benefits if the 
knowledge cap between terrestrial and marine ecosystem services is wanted to be 
closed. (Townsend et al., 2018) 
European Marine Board (Austen et al., 2019) state that valuation of the benefits from 
marine ecosystem services can support policy development and sustainable blue 
growth as well as arouse debate on the importance of the marine environment. 
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European Marine Board (Austen et al., 2019) recommends that ecosystem valuations 
should be better included into marine management decision models, since right now 
ecosystem valuation are only rarely exploited in marine policy decisions. European 
Marine Board (Austen et al., 2019) published recommendations on where researchers 
should focus on in order to make their work better suited for decision-making 
process. Firstly, they recommend that ecosystem frameworks should be harmonized 
because current situation, where multiple classification systems and frameworks 
exists, complicates comparability of the results. Secondly, clear indicators between 
ecosystem functions and ecosystem services and benefits need to be identified in 
order to include them into already existing monitoring programs. Thirdly, European 
Marine Board (Austen et al., 2019) advice that open database should be created, 
where data and the results of marine ecosystem service valuation studies are stored. 
Open database would improve comparability and usability of the results of the 
valuation studies. Researchers should work with these issues and try to come up with 
adequate solutions in order valuation of marine ecosystem service to be better 
considered for decision-making process.  
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis has estimated the value of the European Union’s maximal potential fish 
landing in the Northeast Atlantic and compared different rebuilding pathways for the 
stocks. This work is part of a bigger entity where European Union strives to estimate 
the total value of marine ecosystem services. This study highlights the importance of 
stocks recovery and underlines the economic incentive to do so.  
EU’s maximum potential fish landing in Northeast Atlantic was calculated in an 
imaginary situation where all stocks could produce MSY at the same time. Growth 
potential of EU’s fisheries sector was obtained by comparing fishers’ current profit 
with the theoretical maximum profit. Stocks must be rebuilt in order them to produce 
MSY. Different rebuilding pathways were defined, and rebuilding time and net 
present value were used to compare different options. Created model is based on 
Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. 
Results of the study indicates that EU’s fishery sector has much to improve. 
Northeast-Atlantic fish stocks are overfished, and EU’s current position is much 
closer to open-access equilibrium point than MSY or MEY point. Reductions in 
fishing effort should be implemented in order stocks to revive. Achieving MSY in 
the long term, fishing effort should be reduced by 38% from the current state, and to 
reach MEY, fishing effort should be reduced by 48%. 
EU fleet are currently making €0.85 billion profit per year. Annual profit could 
increase, as high as, €5.28 billion per year if all stocks could provide MSY. 
Maximum sustainable profit is achieved when stocks are harvested to a point where 
MEY is provided, and profits in MEY would be €5.49 billion. 
Fish stocks rebuilding pathways towards MSY was arranged according to how 
quickly the optimum fishing effort is achieved. According to findings, fishing effort 
should be lowered to optimal as fast as possible, since then net present value is at 
maximum and rebuilding time is the shortest. The results, in this respect, should be 
processed further because the model does not take account other costs that are 
associated to reduction of fishing effort, such as higher unemployment rates.
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Annexes 1 
 
Formulas to calculate required parameters to form Gordon-Schaefer model: 
1) ℎ𝑚𝑠𝑦 =
𝑅𝐾
4
   𝐾 =
4ℎ𝑚𝑠𝑦
𝑅
  
2) 𝐸𝑚𝑠𝑦 =
𝑅
2𝑞
                 𝑞 =
𝑅
2𝐸𝑚𝑠𝑦
 
3) ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑞𝐸𝐾 −
𝑞2𝐾𝐸2
𝑅
 
Place the equations 1 and 2 to the equation 3 and solve R. 
4) ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 = [
𝑅
2𝐸𝑚𝑠𝑦
∗
4ℎ𝑚𝑠𝑦
𝑅
∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡] −
[
𝑅
2𝐸𝑚𝑠𝑦
]
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5) ℎ𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
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6)  
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